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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Economic and Political Background
T he post war period witnessed progressive economic growth and
steady trade liberalization. This movement began with the establish-
ment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947.
During this period, the quantitative import restrictions imposed during
the economic turbulence of the 1930's were removed, and tariffs in inter-
national trade were substantially reduced.
Between 1947 and 1967 six rounds of GATT trade negotiations took
place. While the five rounds prior to the Dillon Round in 1962 took an
item-per-item approach to tariff reductions, the Kennedy Round from
1963-67 introduced the principle of multilaterality to these tariff negotia-
tions. The result was an across-the-board tariff cut averaging 33 percent.
This liberal international trade climate promoted growth in developed
countries which, to some degree was transmitted through trade to the de-
veloping countries.
This climate changed, however, with the collapse of the Bretton
Woods System in 1971, the oil crisis in 1973, and the onset of the world-
wide recession in developed countries beginning in 1974. Relatively high
unemployment rates, stagnant economic growth, and a further shift of
comparative advantage in favor of developing countries contributed to
the emergence of protectionist pressures in developed countries. The
post-1973 situation has therefore been characterized by a steady increase
in protectionist trade measures similar to those prevalent during the
1930's.1
* LL.M. Indiana University (1981), studies of Law and Economics, University of Kiel,
FRG, Candidate for the Staatsexamen.
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I This era has been labelled the "new protectionism". See, e.g., Balassa, The "New
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In 1973, during this period of economic uncertainty, the Tokyo
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) was launched.2 Ninety-
nine countries in diverse stages of development, including GATT non-
members, participated in the negotiations. For the first time, non-tariff
barriers to international trade, which constitute the major manifestation
of the new protectionism, were integrated into the negotiations. One of
the aims of the negotiations as defined by the Tokyo Declaration was to
"include an examination of the adequacy of the multilateral safeguard
system, considering particularly the modalities of application of Article
XIX, with a view to furthering trade liberalization and preserving its
results." 3
Article XIX provides safeguards against import competition.4 Fre-
quently, trading nations differ as to whether a particular measure repre-
sents a legitimate safeguard or a protectionist device. While prior trade
disputes were governed by the appropriate international rules (such as
Article XIX) the new protectionist trends tend to circumvent these rules
or operate under special exemption from them. Actually, contracting par-
ties to the GATT have seldom invoked the safeguard clause of Article
XIX but have resorted instead to analogous actions. These new protec-
tionist measures reflect the inadequacy of the prevailing rules within the
changed atmosphere of internationl trade. The Tokyo Round constitutes
an effort to reconcile these changed economic circumstances with the le-
gal rules currently governing international trade. This article concentrates
on the particular aspect of the safeguard question prior to and during the
Tokyo Round. 5
B. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
The present institutional framework for the conduct of international
commerce, the GATT,' was generated by postwar efforts to restore inter-
Protectionism" and the International Economy, see 12 J. WORLD TRADE L. 409 (1978) (dis-
cussing the post-war trade developments which fanned the protectionist flames).
2 The term "Tokyo Round" refers to the September, 1973 opening Meeting of Minis-
ters in Tokyo which culminated in the 1977 negotiations. For an overview of the groundwork
and conduct of the MTN see 10. LONG, THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGO-
TIATIONS chs. 1-4 (1979).
' GATT: Tokyo Declaration on Multilateral Trade Negotiations, para. 3(d), GATT
Press Release GATT/1134 (Sept. 14, 1973), reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1533,
1534 and 1 0. LONG, supra note 1, at 185-86.
' See Appendix A for the text of article XIX.
' See generally B. NOWZAD, THE RISE ON PROTECTIONISM 1-6 (International Monetary
Fund Pamphlet No. 24, 1978); Balassa, supra note 1, at 409-414, 433; Wassell, Background
to Current Trade Issues, in WORLD TRADE: CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE 80's 12
(B. Balassa ed. 1979).
6 Done Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter cited
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national trade. The initial work, however, focussed on the formation of an
International Trade Organization (ITO), and, after a series of interna-
tional conferences, resulted in the signing of the Final Act of the ITO
Charter at Havana in March, 1948.7 The Havana Charter, founded upon
proposals primarily posed by the United States, contains chapters on
"Employment and Economic Activity," "Economic Development and Re-
construction," "Commercial Policy," "Restrictive Business Practices,"
and "Intergovernmental Commodity Agreements," and includes chapters
on the organizational and procedural aspects of these issues. For reasons
which may be summarily described as perfectionist and protectionist, the
U.S. Congress failed to adopt the ITO Charter.
Meanwhile, during the ITO Charter negotiations at Geneva in 1947, a
General Assembly was developed. It stemmed from tariff negotiations be-
tween 23 countries. These negotiations resulted in a record number of
bilateral agreements which produced generalized concessions. This multi-
lateral trade conference was initially regarded as the first of a number of
such conferences presumedly to be conducted under the authority of the
ITO. To ensure that the agreements would not later be disregarded, the
record, formally entitled "The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,"
incorporated many of the commercial policy provisions of the draft ITO
Charter. The ITO, however, was never established, and the GATT, by
default became the principle legal framework for world trade.8
GATT has never fully been implemented, but it was and continues to
be applied by each contracting party through the the Protocol of Provi-
sional Application.9 This action was taken in order to bypass the problem
of governmental approval, especially in the United States, of GATT pro-
visions which were of such general character that they could not be im-
plemented domestically without such approval. The United States had
entered the GATT negotiations under the authority of the Trade Agree-
ments Act.'0 On the basis of this Act the GATT was negotiated by the
as GATT]. The amended text of GATT is reprinted in 4 GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND
SELECTED DoCuMENTS 1 (1969) [hereinafter cited as GATT, BISD].
U.S. Dep't of State, Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization and Fi-
nal Act and Related Documents (Commercial Policy Series No. 113), (1948).
' For a thorough discussion of the development of and relationship between the ITO
and GATT see J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE LAW AND THE LAW OF GATr 42-57 (1969).
' Haiti is the only country to have adopted GATT definitively. Lacking the numbers
required by Article XXVI(6) to implement. GATT, Haiti may apply the provisions only
through the Protocol of Provisional Application, done Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308 [hereinafter cited as GATT Protocol]. See J. JACKSON, supra note
8, at 60-63.
10 An Act to Extend the Authority of the President under Section 350 of the Tariff Act
of 1930, as Amended, and for other Purposes, ch. 269, 59 Stat. 410 (1945). See Jackson, The
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REv.
249, 253-274 & app. D. (1967) for an analysis of the status of GATT in the United States.
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United States as a congressional executive agreement which in principle
does not require subsequent congressional approval. Some of the general
policy provisions such as the lowering of tariff barriers could not be
clearly subsumed under the authority of the Trade Agreements Act."" Ad-
ditionally, the contracting parties bound themselves to the general com-
mercial policy provisions of Part II of GATT only "to the fullest extent
not inconsistent with existing legislation."12 This so-called grandfather
clause ensures that governmental actions consonant with national legisla-
tion enacted prior to GATT and in conflict with the commercial policy
provisions of GATT do not constitute a violation of the General
Agreement.
Since GATT was designed as a treaty and not as an international
organization, the initial organizational structure was weak. The only insti-
tutional body mentioned in the General Agreement is the "CON-
TRACTING PARTIES." Article XXV paragraph 1 provides that:
"[R]epresentatives of the contracting parties shall meet from time to time
for the purpose of giving effect to those provisions of this Agreement
which involve joint action and, generally, with a view to facilitating the
operation and furthering the objectives of this Agreement."' 3
The term "CONTRACTING PARTIES" was chosen over "Interim
Trade Committee" since the former implied joint action of the treaty sig-
natories rather than the delegation of authority to an international body.
This point was especially relevant to the United States, which was only
authorized under the Trade Agreements Act to enter into an interna-
tional treaty and not to participate in the establishment of an interna-
tional organization. 14 The institution, composed of the "CONTRACTING
PARTIES," can be described as the general forum or assembly of GATT
member nations which convene once a year. GATT has since proved suffi-
cient for the performance of all the necessary organizational and procedu-
ral tasks.
The GATT Secreteriat under the Director-General performs the ad-
ministrative functions typical of the secreteriats of other international or-
ganizations. 15 The Council, which consists of representatives of all con-
tracting parties, carries out the intersessional work of the
"CONTRACTING PARTIES." The primary function of the Council is,
inter alia, to ensure the permanent surveillance of the contracting parties
11 See K. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 342-43 (1970); R.
HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 45-46 (1975); J. JACKSON,
supra note 8, at 44-45, 60-63.
12 GATT Protocol, supra note 9, at 1(b).
13 GATT, supra note 6, at art. XXV(1).
See J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 120.
12 For a discussion of the structure and development of the Secretariat see K. DAM,
supra note 11, at 399-40; J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 145-50.
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over GATT affairs. 6 The establishment of permanent GATT Committees
which consist of representatives of all contracting parties has been a usual
practice in GATT history. These committees include the Balance-of-Pay-
ments Committee, the Committee on Trade and Development, and the
Textile Committee (established to facilitate the administration of the
Textile Arrangements). These committees may usually set up subsidiary
bodies in the form of working parties or panels which study and resolve
particular problems.17 This structure of permanent committees and tem-
porary panels was expanded at the Tokyo Round. At that time a perma-
nent committee was established which is empowered to set up ad hoc
subsidiary bodies.' 8
The only significant change in the text of the GATT occurred in 1964
with the adoption of Part IV concerning "Trade and Development". This
provision recognized the special situation of developing countries in inter-
national trade. 19
C. The GATT Principles of Non-Discrimination and Reciprocity
The principle of non-discrimination pervades the entire GATT
framework. The most obvious provision is Article I section 1, the Most-
Favoured-Nation (MFN) clause.' 0 Any customs advantage given for a
particular product by one party to another must also be given to all other
contracting parties with respect to that good.
To understand the basic rationale behind the MFN clause, it must be
seen against the background of the decline of trade during the 1930's and
World War II. The principle of non-discrimination was essential to the
successful reconstruction of international trade. If every country observed
this principle, all countries would benefit in the long run from a more
open, equitable international trade structure. Products of one GATT
member would not suffer a competitive disadvantage compared to like
16 K. DAM, supra note 11, at 339; J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 156-57.
17 J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 157-62.
18 See, e.g., GATT, Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI,
and XXIII, done Apr. 12, 1979, at pt. II, arts. 12-13, pt. V, art. 16, pt. VI, arts. 17-18, -
U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, - U.N.T.S. - (Subsidies and Countervailing Duties Code),
reprinted in GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 26th Supp. 56 (1980).
"' Part IV encourages developed countries to grant favorable treatment to developing
nations, but it does not create a legal obligation to provide such treatment. See K. DAM,
supra note 11, at 236-42; J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 640-48.
20 The "most favored nation" clause is set out in Appendix B. Other provisions of
GATT which implement the principle of non-discrimination include: art. 111(7); art. IV(6);
art. V(2), (5), (6); art. IX(1); art. XII(1); art. XVII(1); art. XVIII(20); and art. XX(j). Al-
though the actual wording may differ, these clauses have been read to require that the treat-
ment given one CONTRACTING PARTY must be the same as that given to any other
CONTRACTING PARTY. See J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 255.
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products of any third member state and the free trade principle of com-
parative advantage would fully develop.21
The MFN clause generated the legal assurance for equal trade condi-
tions. It has been observed that MEN treatment "transposes equality
under international law into the economic field."2 2 Thus, MFN treatment,
which appears in the economic field as a pragmatic approach toward lib-
eralizing international trade, developed under GATT into a legal princi-
ple of equality.23
Theoretically, MFN treatment has to be granted on an absolutely un-
conditional basis. In practice, however, the rule of reciprocity has an im-
pact on unconditional MEN treatment. Although no explicit reciprocity
clause limits the MFN principle, it is implicitly understood in the GATT
framework that trade negotiations are conducted under the assumption of
"substantially equivalent" concessions on a reciprocal basis.24 Hence, reci-
procity can be described as a "give and take," implying mutual gains.2 5
A reference to the idea of reciprocity can be found in Article XXVIH
which requires that tariff negotiations are to be conducted on a "recipro-
cal and mutually advantageous basis. '26 Thus, MFN treatment operates
within a legal framework which recognizes the principle of reciprocity as
one of its most vital concepts .2 The MEN clause and the reciprocity prin-
ciple complement each other. The latter provides a basic rule for the con-
duct of trade negotiations while the former implements the results of
these negotiations on a multilateral basis ensuring overall trade liberaliza-
tion.2" Both principles came under challenge with the growing diversifica-
tion of the international community.29
D. Safeguard Provisions in International Trade Agreements
The need for safeguard provisions in international trade agreements
21 See K. DAM, supra note 11, at 18; Curzon & Curzon, The Management of Trade
Relations in the GATT, in 1 INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF THE WESTERN WORLD
1959-1971, at 147-49 (A. Shonfield ed. 1976); Gros Espiell, The Most-Favoured-Nation
Clause, 5 J. WORLD TRADE L. 29, 34-35 (1971); The Most-Favoured-Nation Provision, in
SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 93D CONG., 2D SESs., EXECUTIVE BRANCH GATT STUDIES 133-35
(Comm. Print 1974). For a detailed analysis of the GATT MFN clause see J. JACKSON, supra
note 8, at 249-73.
22 Gros Espiell, supra note 21, at 35.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 36.
25 Ibrahim, Developing Countries and the Tokyo Round, 12 J. WORLD TRADE L. 1, 3
(1978).
25 GATT, supra note 6, at art. XXVIII(1).
27 K. DAM, supra note 11, at 59; Curzon & Curzon, supra note 21, at 156-62.
28 Ibrahim, supra note 25, at 4.
29 J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 242-45; Gros Espiell, supra note 21, at 37-44.
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derives from the conflict between internal economic and social responsi-
bilities of governments and their international obligations.30 Increasingly,
governments in the modern world face demands to intervene in the eco-
nomic process to protect the interests of domestic factions and promote
social and economic aims. No segment of contemporary society is immune
from this type of governmental intervention and protection. This resulted
largely from technological advances in communication and transportation
which created markets where participants shared more common political
and economic interests than ever before.3 1 Social and educational pro-
gress also contributed to this development by laying the foundation for
the effective "articulation of new political, social and economic
aspirations. 32
At the same time, however, the international obligations of indepen-
dent nations have increased, precisely because these factors have had
consequences which transcend national boundaries.33 International eco-
nomic interdependence has grown with the development of international
markets. Today, domestic economic intervention affects other states.
Thus, it became desirable to ascertain mutually acceptable international
goals to be implemented through the conclusion of international agree-
ments and the creation of international organizations.
National governments operate on two levels: domestic regulation and
international cooperation. Although these levels are partially congruent,
each imposes constraints on governmental policy. Domestic measures may
interfere with international obligations and international commitments
may limit the freedom to pursue domestic interests.3 ' In order to provide
a means of reconciling such conflicts, safeguard clauses have traditionally
been adopted in international agreements. By invoking a safeguard provi-
sion, a country may protect its domestic interests without impairing its
international obligations.
3 5
The reason for safeguard provisions is twofold. First, they serve eco-
nomic necessities. Trade liberalization promotes economic growth and de-
velopment according to the principle of comparative advantage.36 This
process involves adjustment since efficiently operating domestic indus-
tries might suddenly face more efficient foreign producers. Industries in
some countries decline, while industries in other countries expand. To en-
30 D. ROBERTSON, FAIL SAFE SYSTEMS FOR TRADE LIBERALISATION 1 (Trade Policy Re-
search Centre, Thames Essay No. 12, London, 1977). The following discussion of the neces-
sity and role of safeguard provisions derives primarily from Mr. Robertson's analysis.
31 Id. (citing I. KRAviS, DomEsTIc INTERESTS AND INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS (1963)).
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 1-2.
35 Id. at 2.
36 Id. at 3-5.
1982
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
sure an orderly and gradual shift of comparative advantage, adjustment
to changed patterns of international trade must be regulated. For this
purpose safeguard provisions may be invoked which permit temporary
trade restrictions and ease the hardship of the adjustment process for the
affected industries and workers.
Second, safeguards are adopted for political reasons. In the event of
unforeseen difficulties they provide means to derogate international obli-
gations.3 7 Since governments are usually more aware of their domestic ob-
ligations, absolute international commitments might be too onerous on
the domestic political level. Those worried about the domestic implica-
tions of international obligations may rest assured that under exceptional
circumstances an escape hatch remains. Domestic interests are permitted
to prevail under certain circumstances. Thus, domestic reluctance to-
wards international commitments can be assuaged. These safeguards pro-
mote a sense of "good will" which encourages member nations to enter
into international agreements. They also ensure the continued existence
of the agreement, since countries would be forced to reevaluate it in the
event of a national emergency.
In order to make a safeguard system work, safeguard clauses must be
carefully drafted. If safeguards are defined too narrowly or are subjected
to overly strict conditions, governments might use means outside the in-
fluence of the international agreement to protect their national interests.
If safeguards are designed too liberally such as to invite their frequent
invocation, they obviate the objectives of the agreement.3 8
The use of safeguards will be discussed in the following analysis of
emergency actions taken against the import of particular products caus-
ing injury to domestic producers. Before turning to the "escape clause" of
Article XIX, the safeguard system of GATT will be briefly outlined, since
particularly in the case of GATT it has been argued that "the exceptions
to the rules of trade laid down by the document appear to be more nu-
merous than the conformances." 9
E. Safeguard Provisions in GATT
In addition to Article XIX, the GATT contains at least nine different
safeguard clauses. Article VI, paragraphs 2 and 3 permit the imposition of
anti-dumping and countervailing duties.40 The GATT does not prohibit
dumping and subsidies, but rather regards them as unfair trade practices
against which countries can defend themselves by imposing anti-dumping
"' Id. at 5.
38 Id. at 6.
1 I. KRAVIS, supra note 31, at 26.
40 GATT, supra note 6, at art. VI(2), (3).
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and countervailing duties.4 1 Both safeguard actions were reviewed during
the Tokyo Round and were thereafter elaborated in an effort to achieve
more effective international discipline and surveillance. Furthermore, the
Revised GATT Anti-dumping Code brought certain provisions into line
with the Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, most notably the
determination of injury.42
Article XI, paragraph 2 permits, as an exception to paragraph 1, the
imposition of quantitative restrictions with respect to the importation
and exportation of products. 43 Paragraph 2(c), which allows import re-
strictions on any agricultural or fisheries product, was critical to the de-
veloping countries for the protection of their essential resources of pri-
mary products and to pursue development programs in this field. 44
Under Article XII countries may impose quantitiative import restric-
tions to safeguard their external financial position and their balance of
payments. 45 In practice, however, the means of Article XII proved to be
inadequate and countries resorted to import surcharges and similar
financial measures in order to restore a balance of payments equilib-
rium.46 Moreover, procedural delays in the GATT surveillance system
called for an improvement of the provision. This topic was dealt with at
the Tokyo Round. As a result, countries are now entitled to impose re-
strictive import measures other than the quantitative restrictions under
Article XII provided certain requirements are fulfilled.4
Article XVIII was overhauled in 1955.4s Section B transposes the
provisions of Article XII for the particular use of developing countries.
Sections A and C were originally designed to allow developing countries
use of restrictive import measures to promote and protect the establish-
ment of infant industries. The Tokyo Round broadened the use of such
measures. Now countries may resort to Article XVII to implement pro-
grams aimed at the development of new production structures or the
modification of existing structures in order to achieve fuller and more effi-
cient use of resources in accordance with the priorities of their economic
41 J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 401-03.
42 Compare GATT, Agreement on the Implementations of Article VI, done Apr. 12,
1979, at pt. II, art. 15, - U.S.T. , T.I.A.S. No. 9650, - U.N.T.S. - (Revised Anti-
Dumpting Code) reprinted in GATT, GISD, supra note 4, 26 Supp. 171 (1980) with GATT,
Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII (Subsidies
and Countervailing Duties Code), supra note 18.
41 GATT, supra note 6, at art. XI(2).
44 J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 317-18.
41 GATT, supra note 6, at art. XII.
4' See D. ROBERTSON, supra note 30, at 15.
47 GATT, Declaration on Trade Measures Taken for Balance-of-Payments Purposes,
done Nov. 28, 1979, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. -, - U.N.T.S. -, reprinted in GATT,
BISD, supra note 6, at 26th Supp. 205; 10. LONG, supra note 2, at 100-03.
4' See J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 640.
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development."9
The general exceptions of Articles XX and XXI have been described
as provisions that "may be most troublesome and most subject to abuse
of all GATT exceptions." 50 According to these provisions governments
may not be prevented from adopting measures which are regarded as nec-
essary to protect health and welfare5 1 (Article XX) as well as national
security (Article XXI).5 2 Such provisions are typical to international com-
mercial treaties. An inherent danger lies in the easy application of general
terms, such as "essential security needs" for justifying trade restrictions.5 3
Particularly noteworthy is Article XXI(i) which authorizes export restric-
tions in the case of short domestic supply.54 Although little consideration
has been given to this provision in the past, it nevertheless provides a
framework within which procedures for the regulation of export controls
can be established. The oil embargo of 1973 may illustrate that sudden
restrictions on supply are potentially as disruptive as sudden increases of
imports. 5 Article XX has not been invoked, and it can be assumed that
misuse of the provision can be counterbalanced by Article XXIII, the
GATT clause on nullification and impairment.56 Article XXI has been in-
voked several times, but most disputes have been settled after
consultation.57
The waiver is the most flexible safeguard clause in GATT. 5s Under
exceptional circumstances a country may be released from its GATT obli-
gations under Article XXV, section 5. A waiver must be approved by a
two-thirds majority of votes cast by more than half of the contracting
parties. In general, waivers under Article XXV, section 5 fall into one of
the following seven categories: 59
1) Newly independent states were allowed to retain old trade preferences
usually with their former colonial powers.
19 See GATT, Safeguard Action for Development Purposes, done Nov. 28, 1979, -
U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. U.N.T.S. -, reprinted in GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 26th
Supp. 209.
50 J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 741.
5' GATT, supra note 6, at art. XX.
52 GATT, supra note 6, at art. XXI. Provisions similar to Article XX and XXI com-
monly appear on other commercial treaties. See D. ROBERTSON, supra note 38, at 13-14.
D. ROBERTSON, supra note 38, at 14.
GATT, supra note 6, at art. XX(I)(i).
55 D. ROBERTSON, supra note 38, at 14.
"' J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 741-42. Most recently Sweden has referred to Article
XXI "in spirit" in order to justify import restrictions, but nevertheless agreed to consulta-
tions. See GATT AcTvrrms IN 1975, at 61.
j. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 748-52.
GATT, supra note 6, at art. XXV(5).
For a more complete development of these seven categories see J. JACKSON, supra
note 8, at 545-46 nn.1-7.
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2) Contracting parties were temporarily released from their GATT obli-
gations in order to recognize their fiscal system.
3) Regional associations of states not covered by Article XXIV were
legalized.
4) Special agreements between some countries and the International
Monetary Fund were authorized to avoid the provisions of Article XV.
5) Special import restrictions, such as surcharges, were permitted be-
cause of balance of payments difficulties.
6) Import quotas on agricultural products which were in violation of
GATT were subsequently legalized.
7) Various time limits required by GATT were extended.
Several other GATT provisions contain clauses similar to the waiver.
Under Article XXIII, tariff concessions may be withdrawn or modi-
fied three years after their initial negotiation. 0 And under Article XXXV,
a contracting party is entitled to refrain from applying the GATT to any
new member. 1 This provision became important with the accession of
Japan to the GATT in 1955.
II. ARTICLE XIX AND THE IssuE oF "MARKET DiSRUPTION"
The United States was the chief proponent of Article XIX,6 2 the es-
cape clause. A similar clause appeared in a trade agreement between the
United States and Mexico in 1942.3 During the congressional hearings on
the Trade Agreements Extension Act, concerns about the disruptive im-
pact of increasing imports on the domestic industry as a consequence of
the Act surfaced. The U.S. State Department quelled these fears by in-
corporating proper safeguard provisions in its reciprocal trade agreements
beginning with the Mexican agreement." Indeed, the escape clause of Ar-
ticle XIX was an important factor in the tacit approval of the GATT by
Congress after ITO failed to materialize.65
As outlined by the United States, the purpose of the escape clause
10 GATT, supra note 6, at art. XXIII.
61 Id. at art. XXXV. This provision has been invoked frequently against Japan since
1955. See, GATT, Analytical Index 161-62 (2d rev. 1966).
02 See J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 553. The text of Article XIX is reprinted in Appen-
dix A.
63 Agreement Respecting Reciprocal Trade, Dec. 23, 1942, United States - Mexico, art.
XI, 57 Stat. 833, 845, E.A.S. No. 311 (terminated Dec. 31, 1950).
" Extension of Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act: Hearings Before the House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 81, 179, 206-07, 273, 275-76, 280, 798-801 (1945).
In 1947 President Truman, by executive order, required that all future trade agreements
contain an escape clause similar to Article XI of the Mexican Treaty. Exec. Order No. 9832,
3 C.F.R. 624 (1943-48 comp.).
65 K. DAM, supra note 11, at 107 n.64 (citing C. WIcox, A CHATER FOR WORLD TRADE
183 (1949)).
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was to give GATT member states more flexibility in emergency situations
and to provide temporary import relief as an exception to the GATT
commitments." Thus, safeguard action under Article XIX was under-
stood to be restricted in its application to temporary emergency mea-
sures. Later, Congress wrote the escape clause into statutory law with the
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, and has continued to include it
in subsequent laws.6 7
Article XIX permits safeguard actions against import competition. A
nation is entitled to take such action only if it has fulfilled three basic
sets of requirements:
1) There must be an abnormal increase in the import of a certain
product.
This criterion is fulfilled not only in the case of absolute but also
relative import increases as it was expressed in the escape clause of the
Havana Charter, Article 40, and reasserted by the "CONTRACTING
PARTIES" with respect to Article XIX GATT in a Working Party Re-
port in 1948.68
2) The increased imports must be a result of both unforeseen develop-
ments and GATT obligations.
This implies that a contracting party has no right to invoke Article
XIX, if the import increase would have occurred anyway.69
3) The imports must enter in such increased quantities and under such
conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to the domestic produc-
ers of like or directly competitive goods.70
To summarize, the invocation of Article XIX is subject to three causal
factors: first, the increased imports have to be causally related to unfore-
seen developments; second, they must affect GATT obligations; and
third, they must cause serious injury.
Subject to the fulfillment of these requirements, the invoking party
may either withdraw or modify a tariff concession or impose a quantita-
88 J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 554-55.
67 Trade Agreements Extension Act §1951, ch. 141, §§6, 7(b), 65 Stat. 72, 73,-74; Trade
Agreements Extension Act of 1955, ch. 169, §6, 69 Stat. 162, 166; Trade Agreements Exten-
sion Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85 - 686, 72 Stat. 673; Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L.
No. 87-794, §301(b), 76 Stat. 872, 884; Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §201, 88 Stat.
1978, 2011-12, 19 U.S.C. §2251(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
" The report stated, "[I]t was also the understanding of the working party that the
phrase 'being imported... in such increased quantities' in Article XIX, paragraph I(a),
was intended to cover cases where imports may have increased relatively, as made clear in
Article 40, paragraph I(a), of the Havana Charter." 2 GATT, BISD, supra note 6, at 44-45
(1952).
88 K. DAM, supra note 11, at 101.
J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 557.
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tive import restriction on the product in question.71 The imposition of a
quantitative restriction must be understood as a departure from the gen-
eral obligation to refrain from quantitative restrictions under Article XI
GATT.
The safeguard action itself has to comply with certain substantial
and procedural conditions: 72
1) The withdrawn obligation has to relate causally to to the in-
crease in imports implying that only the obligation which pro-
vided the opportunity of the increased imports may be revoked.73
2) The withdrawal must be only with respect to the imported
product in question and not to any other product.7 4
3) The safeguard measure shall only be maintained "to the extent
and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such
injury."75
This condition refers to the envisaged temporary character of
safeguard measures under Article XIX which were to apply for a
limited time to emergency cases only. A government taking action
under Article XIX should continually review the safeguard mea-
sure and reconsider its action as soon as the protection is no
longer necessary.7 6
4) The safeguard measure has to be applied in a nondiscrimina-
tory manner, in accordance with the most-favoured-nation clause.
Consequently, all supplier countries have to be treated equally.
Although the application of the MFN clause involves termi-
nological difficulties, 77 the essential non-discriminatory applica-
tion of Article XIX measures originates from an interpretative
note to Article 40 of the Havana Charter." According to Article
XIII, quantitative restrictions are required to apply directly in a
71 GATT, supra note 6, at art. XIX(1)(a). See J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 559, 565.
72 The conditions are set out in J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 564.
73 GATT, supra note 6, at art. XIX(1)(a). Professor Jackson relies on the "in respect to
such product" language to infer this causal requirement. J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 564
n.2.
74 GATT, supra note 8, at 564 n.2.
7 Id. at art. XIX(1)(a).
7' See GATT, Report on the Withdrawal by the United States of a Tariff Concession
under Article XIX of the GATT 29 (1951)[hereinafter cited as Hatters' Fur Case].
77 In the case of trade restrictions instead of trade preferences the MFN clause appears
to be a "most disfavoured-nation clause."
7' See J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 564 n.5 (quoting the Interpretative Note). The note
states: "It is understood that any suspension, withdrawal or modification under paragraphs
1(a), I(b), and 3(b) must not discriminate against imports from any Member country, and
that such action should avoid, to the fullest extent possible, injury to other supplying Mem-
ber countries." U.S. Dept. of State, Havana Charter for an International Trade Organiza-
tion, supra note 7, at 65; see also K. DAM, supra note 11, at 105.
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non-dicriminatory fashion.
5) The safeguard action is furthermore subject to certain proce-
dural criteria. Prior to the imposition of safeguards of importing
country must notify the "CONTRACTING PARTIES" of the
measures which it intends to take and has to then enter into con-
sultations with the concerned GATT member countries. Only
under "critical circumstances" might the safeguard action be in-
troduced without prior consultations, but consultations must
commence immediately after the action has been taken.7 9
During these consultations the importing country either makes com-
pensatory concessions to the parties affected by the safeguard action or
agrees to compensatory withdrawal of concessions by the affected par-
ties. 0 The compensation practice developed ad hoc in the consultations
with all concerned countries participating. Therefore compensation de-
rives from the MFN principle."'
If an agreement is not reached, the importing country is, neverthe-
less, free to take the emergency action. In this case, however, the export-
ing countries are allowed to suspend substantially equivalent concessions,
provided they give notice to the "CONTRACTING PARTIES" and the
latter do not disapprove.8 2 This compensatory remedy is applied in a dis-
criminatory fashion against the importing country, since it is basically
aimed at reassessing trade shares according to the principle of
reciprocity.83
The advantage for the safeguarding country in offering compensation
is that it may designate the items on which it is prepared to make com-
pensatory concessions. Compensatory retaliation measures taken by the
affected exporting country are subject to retaliatory trade restrictions.8"
It is important to remember that Article XIX constitutes an excep-
tion to the general prohibition against quantitative restrictions under
Article XI and, if quantitative restrictions are in fact imposed, this has to
be done in a non-discriminatory fashion.
A. Application of Article XIX
Article XIX has been invoked approximately one hundred times.8 5
11 GATT, supra note 6, at art. XIX.80 See J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 565.
81 Tumlir, A Revised Safeguard Clause for GATT? 7 J. WORLD TRADE L. 404, 408-09
(1973).
82 GATT, supra note 6, at art. XIX(3)(a).
8 j. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 566.
G. CURZON, MULTILATERAL COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY 118 (1965).
s' The estimate of one hundred invocations of Article XIX is based on a variety of
studies. See GATT, Analytical Index 109-13 (rev. ed. 1970)(provides information up to
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Safeguard actions have been relatively few in recent years and have usu-
ally taken the form of quantitative restrictions."8 Approximately one-
third of the Article XIX disputes have been resolved by compensation
offers.8 7 These settlements were confined to tariff actions.8  Furthermore,
it has been estimated that in about half of the cases the exports of devel-
oping countries were affected.8
As early as 1951, a major case revealed one of the weaknesses of Arti-
cle XIX, and the vague definition of its requirements. The Hatters' Fur
Case grew out of a trade dispute between the United States and Czecho-
slovakia.9 0 In 1950, the United States withdrew a tariff concession which
has been negotiated at Geneva in 1947. A prior investigation by the U.S.
Tariff Commission 1 had resulted in the conclusion that women's fur hats
were being imported in increased quantities and under such conditions as
to cause serious injury to the domestic industry. Accordingly, the United
States took action under Article XIX and withdrew the applicable tariff
concession. This action was challenged by Czechoslovakia and referred by
the "CONTRACTING PARTIES" to a specially appointed working
party.
In its report the working party concluded that the term "unforeseen
development" should be interpreted to mean "developments occurring af-
ter the negotiation of the relevant tariff concession which it would not be
reasonable to expect that the negotiators of the country making the con-
cession could and should have foreseen at the time when the concession
was negotiated. '9 2 On the basis of that interpretation, the Czechoslovak
delegation argued that the change of fashion, which caused the increased
imports, was not an unforeseen development, since "it is universally
known that fashions are subject to constant changes." 93 The working
1970); GATT Activities (all volumes since 1974); B. NowzAD, supra note 5, at 78 (compiling
information between 1971 and 1977): GATT Provisions on Relief from Injurious Imports, in
SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., ExEcuTIvE BRANCH GATT STUDmiEs 121, 129
(Comm. Print 1974) (information through 1973); Meier, Externality Law and Market Safe-
guards: Applications in the GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 18 HARv. INr'L L.J.
491, 496 (1977)(covering 1974-1976).
"See B. NowzAD, supra note 5, at 77; Meier, supra note 85, at 496.
'T See Meier, supra note 85, at 496; Tumlir, supra note 81, at 409 n.8.
Tumlir, supra note 81, at 410 n.9.
Bhagwati, Market Distruption, Compensation and GATT Reform 4 WORLD DEv.
989, 993 (1976).
90 Hatters' Fur Case, supra note 76.
91 The United States Tariff Commission is now known as the United States Interna-
tional Trade Commission. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §171(a), 88 Stat. 1978,
2009, 19 U.S.C. §2231 (1976).
92 Hatters' Fur Case, supra note 76, at 10 quoted in J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 560-
61.
" Hatters' Fur Case, supra note 76 at 10.
1982
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
party agreed with that view, but concluded that "the degree to which the
change in fashion affected the competitive situation could not reasonably
be expected to have been foreseen by the U.S. authorities in 1947" and
therefore the "unforeseen development" requirement was satisfied."
With this conclusion the working party reached a rather lenient in-
terpretation of this requirement of Article XIX. Increased imports alone,
provided they occur to a degree which could not have been foreseen, are
enough to constitute an "unforeseen development." Certainly this would
be the case whenever imports increased substantially with the result be-
ing that increased imports alone are evidence of an "unforeseen
development." 5
The working party did not refer to the second causal requirement,
that the increased imports must involve GATT obligations. It held only
that the concession granted by the United States at Geneva was substan-
tial and had the effect of reducing the price in favor of the imported
items."8 Theoretically, every question of causality requires that coinciden-
tal and causal relationships be distinguished. However, in practical appli-
cation there is a strong tendency to equate coincidence with causality.
Since a GATT obligation exists for virtually every product, the impact of
a GATT obligation on increased imports seems to be established in al-
most every case.9 7 Consequently, a country invoking Article XIX must
simply show increased imports of a certain item covered by a GATT
obligation.
The third causal prerequisite of Article XIX requires that the im-
ports cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers of like or
directly competitive products. With respect to the finding of a "serious
injury" the working party reached a result as inconclusive as that regard-
ing the determination of "unforeseen developments." The case was de-
cided in favor of the United States despite their failure to provide suffi-
cient evidence of injury. In fact, the working party agreed with the
Czechoslovak contention that the "data cannot be said to point convinc-
ingly in either direction," '8 implying that a serious injury was not proved.
The working panel based its decision on the view that "the United
States were [sic] not called upon to prove conclusively that the degree of
injury. . . must be regarded as serious; since the question under consid-
eration was whether or not they are in breach of Art. XIX, they are enti-
94 Id. at 12. (emphasis added).
"I See J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 561.
96 Hatters' Fur Case, supra note 76, at 9, 13.
J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 559.
98 Hatters' Fur Case, supra note 76, at 22. For a critical evaluation of the U. S. data see
the statement of the Czechoslovak delegate. Id. at 15-20.
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tled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt."9 9 Since no conclusive facts
had been advanced by Czechoslovakia, it had failed to overcome this
doubt. 00
Considering the restricted party's virtual inaccessibility to the facts
of the injury, and the fact that an Article XIX action is an exception to
the general GATT rules, the imposition of the burden of proof upon the
affected country appears to contradict the logical legal burden.10 1 In any
case, this procedural ruling seems to imply that countries can count on
much easier access to Article XIX than might have been concluded from
the original wording of the provision. As a net result, Article XIX became
applicable in nearly every situation of increased imports. Consequently, it
became desirable to define the term "serious injury" more precisely and
to require comprehensive and conclusive evidence of the causal relation-
ship between the increased imports and the injury.
The present importance of Article XIX, can be examined through
analysis of more recent cases. The range of recently affected products in-
cludes the traditional labor-intensive products of developing countries,
such as textiles, leather goods and footwear, and more frequently ad-
vanced items, such as electronic equipment, machinery, tooks, ballbear-
ings, and other minor manufactures.10 2 In the production of the latter
items the developing countries0 3 and Japan have become increasingly
competitive and accordingly have been the principally affected countries.
The following cases illustrate the trend regarding Article XIX.
In 1974, Australia invoked Article XIX regarding certain footwear; T0
in 1975, regarding motor vehicles, footwear, carpets, steel sheets and
plates, and textiles;0 5 and in 1978 reiterated the motor vehicle restric-
tions.106 Canada invoked Article XIX with respect to cattle, beef and veal
"g Id. at 23.
100 Id. at 22.
101 The proper allocation of the burden of proof depends on a variety of factors, includ-
ing which party has easier access to the information. See Morgan, Some Observations Con-
cerning Presumptions, 44 HAnv. L. REv. 906, 911 (1931).
101 See UNCTAD, Implications for Developing Countries of the New Protectionism in
Developing Countries 4, TD1226 (March 6, 1979); D. ROBERTSON, supra note 30, at 24.
103 One has to be aware of the generalization of the term "developing countries." Devel-
oping countries can be differentiated according to their income per capita and other factors
into such categories as least developed countries and less developed countries. Only the
most advanced of the less developed countries, such as Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea,
Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, which are experiencing the beginning of a significant indus-
trialization process, produce manufactures in direct competition with the producers in the
industrialized countries. These newly industrialized countries are referred to in this context.
104 GATT AcTrrEs IN 1974, at 49.
101 GATT AcTlvrs IN 1975, at 55.
101 GATT AcTvrrIEs IN 1977, at 68.
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in 1974;107 with respect to clothing items in 1976;118 again with respect to
veal and beef in 1976;111 and in 1977 with respect to double knit
fabrics.110 The United States took emergency action under Article XIX
with respect to specialty steel in 1976.111 The European Community im-
posed selective import quotas under Article XIX on television receivers
from South Korea.112 Finland invoked Article XIX in 1977 with respect to
women's panty hose, which was particularly criticized as being aimed at
developing countries.11 And finally Norway took import measures under
Article XIX in 1978 regarding textiles in order to legalize previously es-
tablished restrictions on imports from Hong Kong.1 4
B. Circumvention of Article XIX
In contrast, most situations where imports caused or threatened seri-
ous injury to domestic industries were addressed without regard to Article
XIX. Despite access to the escape clause, there is a general reluctance to
invoke this provision. The reasons for this reluctance reveal additional
difficulties concerning the application of Article XIX which were elimi-
nated during the Tokyo Round.115
Various techniques have been used to sidestep Article XIX. These
circumventions occurred in the form of measures within the framework of
GATT, measures not specifically covered by the GATT but still within its
auspices, and measures in complete disregard of GATT.
1. Circumvention of Article XIX Inside the GATT Framework
Methods of bypassing Article XIX can be found in other GATT safe-
guard clauses.1 1 6 Depending on the type of product, whether primary or
manufactured, and depending on general circumstances, alternative
clauses can be invoked.
In this context, an early case arose with Japan's accession to the
GATT in 1955. Japanese exports, mainly of textiles, grew rapidly in the
early 1950's and created a major problem for the industrialized states of
the western hemisphere. But instead of invoking Article XIX, the proper
107 GATT AcTvrrs IN 1974, at 51.
101 GATT AcTrrms IN 1976, at 66.
109 Id. at 76.
110 GATT AcTrms IN 1977, at 69.
1 GATT AcTwvrms IN 1976, at 74.
112 GATT AcTvrrs IN 1978, at 85.
113 GATT AcTrmvEs IN 1977, at 69.
114 GATT AcTIvrriEs IN 1978, at 95-96.
115 10. LONG, supra note 2, at 90.
"I See supra notes 40-59 and accompanying text; See also GATT Provision in Relief
from Injurious Imports, supra note 85, at 124-25.
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provision for emergency actions on imports, the affected countries re-
sorted to article XXXV, which entitles any contracting party to avoid
GATT obligations to any new contracting party to whose application it
does not consent.117 Fourteen countries, representing about 40 percent of
the GATT foreign trade refused to consent to Japan's accession under
Article XXXV.118 In total, 43 countries resorted to the contemporaneous
Article XXXV action against Japan. Relatively few contracting parties
understood the Article XXXV action as a temporary device.119
A GATT working party was established to examine the issue in
1961.120 It reported that one principal motivation for using Article XXXV
was to impose special discriminatory restrictions on Japan. 21 The work-
ing party revealed that the Article XXXV actions were mainly motivated
by the threat Japanese exports posed to the domestic industries of the
invoking countries-precisely the Article XIX issue.122
During that time another problem of increased import competition
occurred. The sudden increase in textile exports from developing coun-
tries led to the establishment of a GATT working party in 1960.23 Its
report on "Market Disruption" caused by so-called low-wage manufac-
tures, in particular cotton textiles, revealed additional problems related
to Article XIX. Thus the report determined:
that whether or not safeguards against situations of "market disruption"
were already available within the provisions of the General Agreement,
there were political and psychological elements in the problem which
rendered it doubtful whether such safeguards would be sufficient to lead
some contracting parties which are dealing with these problems outside
the framework of the General Agreement or in contravention of its provi-
sions to abandon these exceptional methods at this time.124
In its statement the working party referred to the increasing practice of
sidestepping the entire GATT framework through "voluntary" bilateral
restraint agreements designed to deal with the market dislocations caused
by increased imports. However, the purpose of the report, to achieve a
detailed analysis of Article XIX and the economic, social, and commercial
aspects of market disruption, was not fulfilled. 25 The only result reached
117 GATT, supra note 6, at art. XXXV.
118 See K. DA?.i, supra note 11, at 348 (citing GATT, Analytical Index 161-62 (rev. 2d
ed. 1966)). A total of 43 countries invoked Article XXIV against Japan. Id.
119 Id.; Curzon & Curzon, supra note 21, at 254-55.
120 GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 10th Supp. 69 (1962).
121 GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 10th Supp. 70 (1962). By comparison, Article XIX must
be applied in a non-discriminatory manner. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
122 GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 10th Supp. 71 (1962).
023 GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 9th Supp. 106 (1961).
124 GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 9th Supp. 106 (1961).
125 See GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 9th Supp. 27-28, 108 (1961) (outlinging the purpose
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on the issue was a more elaborate, yet still insufficient definition of "mar-
ket disruption," which in essence is nothing more than another term for
the "serious injury" requirement of Article XIX.16
2. Circumvention of Article XIX under the Auspices of GATT
In response to the widespread Article XXXV actions, Japan entered
into bilateral agreements with most of the important trading countries
invoking the provision. 27 In these agreements Japan "voluntarily" agreed
to restrain its exports of products causing market disruption. 28 Conse-
quently, these countries discontinued to invoke Article XXXV and the
principle of "orderly marketing" was endorsed. 2 9 By the mid-1960's Ja-
pan had concluded such agreements with about 20 trading partners. The
most important commodities affected were textiles and clothing items.""
Since textile imports also originated in high proportions in various devel-
oping countries and caused the greatest dislocation among all products in
the markets of the industrialized countries, these products were singled
out for special treatment under GATT auspices.""
a. The Short-Term Arrangement on Cotton Textiles
Upon the initiative of the United States, the first formalized agree-
ment on market disruption, the Short-Term Arrangement regarding cot-
and structure of the proposed analysis).
128 The Working Party found that a "market disruption" generally combines several
elements, including:
(i) a sharp and substantial increase or potential increase of imports of particular
products from particular sources;
(ii) these products are offered at prices which are substantially below those pre-
vailing for similar goods of comparable quality in the market of the importing
country;
(iii) there is a serious damage to domestic producers or threat thereof;
(iv) the price differentials referred to in paragraph (ii) above do not arise from
governmental intervention in the fixing or formation of prices or from dumping
practices.
GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 9th Supp. 26 (1961). The CONTRACTING PARTIES estab-
lished the Working Party on Avoidance of Market Disruption as a permanent committee.
The committee, however, eventually disbanded. See J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 157 n.1
(stating that the Market Disruption Committee faded into disuse).
127 See G. PATTERSON, DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY ISSUES 1945-
1965, at 293-94 (1966); see also supra note 61 and accompanying text.
128 K. DAM, supra note 11, at 299; Curzon & Curzon, supra note 21, at 257-59.
129 G. PATERSON, supra note 127, at 295.
130 Id. at 296.
"I Id. at 307-08. Several industrialized nations, including the United Kingdom and the
United States, negotiated bilateral restraint agreements with the major cotton textile pro-
ducers of the Third World. Id. at 308; Curzon & Curzon, supra note 21, at 260.
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ton textiles (STA), was negotiated in Geneva in 1962.132 Pending a long-
term solution the agreement was designed:
(i) to significantly increase access to markets where imports are at pre-
sent subject to restriction;
(ii) to maintain orderly access to markets where restrictions are not at
present maintained; and
(iii) to secure from exporting countries, where necessary, a measure of
restraint in their export policy so as to avoid disruptive effects in import
markets.133
In cases where imports of cotton textiles were either causing or threaten-
ing to cause disruption of the domestic market of a participating country,
such country was entitled to request export restraints from the exporting
county. If such an accord was not reached, import levels could be unilat-
erally restricted.
3 4
In interpreting this safeguard provision the participating parties re-
ferred to the decision on market disruption of the "CONTRACTING
PARTIES"13 5 and included this definition in Annex A of the Agree-
ment.13 ' It is noteworthy that the affected textile products were broken
down into 64 different categories.137 Most of the participating developing
countries appear to have accepted the agreement in order to avoid even
more stringent import quotas on a bilateral basis.1 The STA remained
in force for one year, from October 1961 to September 1962."'8
b. The Long-Term Arrangement on Cotton Textiles
The Long-Term Arrangement on Cotton Textiles (LTA), which en-
tered into force in October 1962,1'40 followed the orderly marketing ap-
proach of its predecessor to avoid disruptive import effects. It was in-
tended to be equally in the interest of both developing and developed
countries by reference to disruptive effects in importing and exporting
132 Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles, done July 21, 1961,
12 U.S.T. 1675, T.I.A.S. No. 4884, reprinted in GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 10th Supp. 18
(1962)[hereinafter cited as Short-term Arrangement].
133 Id. at art. L
134 Id. at art. I(A).
131 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
26 Short-term Arrangement, supra note 132, at App. A.
137 Id. at App. B.
'ss See G. PATrERSON, supra note 127, at 310.
139 The Arrangement was designed to remain in effect for the twelve-month period be-
ginning October 1, 1961. Short-term Arrangement, supra note 132, at art. I.
140 Long-Term Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles, done
Feb. 9, 1962, 13 U.S.T. 2672, T.I.A.S. No. 5240 (entered into force Oct. 1, 1962), reprinted
in GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 11th Supp. 25 (1963)[hereinafter cited as Long-term
Arrangement].
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countires.241 In addition, the LTA expressly considered the comparative
advantage of the developing countries by "providing larger opportunities
for increasing their, exchange earnings from the sale in world markets of
products which they can efficiently. manufacture." 42
Under the safeguard provision of Article 3 of the LTA, an importing
country could request export restraints from the exporting country.2
43 If
the exporting country did not accede to the request, import quotas could
be imposed.' 44 As in the STA, the term "market disruption" was based on
the GATT working party definition, but subject to some interpretative
changes."48 Thus, the price criterion of subparagraph (ii) was to be deter-
mined in relation to the prices at which other exporting countries sell
their goods in the importing country,146 and the damage criterion of sub-
paragraph (iii) referred to damage "caused directly by market disruption
and not by any change of consumer taste, technological advance, or simi-
lar factors."1147 Finally, a "threat" of market disruption meant an "actual
and not a potential threat.""84 But despite these efforts to define "market
disruption" more explicitly and to make safeguard actions less likely, the
United States immediately imposed 115 Article 3 restraints during the
first 12 months of the Agreement. The action affected 49 out of the 64
categories already included in the STA."
4 9
Furthermore the LTA, under Article 4, permitted mutually accept-
able bilateral arrangements to regulate trade in cotton textiles on terms
not inconsistent with the objectives of the Agreement. 50 There has been
a shift in emphasis from Article 3 actions to Article 4, which in the case of
the United States has been demonstrated in relation to 29 countries by
1972.151
Some of the most severe criticism of the LTA centered around the
insufficient definition of "market disruption", a problem which had sur-
141 Id. at preamble, 4th consideration.
14 Id. at preamble, 2d consideration.
143 114A. C6mpare id. at art. 3(1) with Short-term Arrangement, supra note 132, at art.
I(A).
144 Long-term Arrangement, supra note 140, at art. 3(3).
45 Id. at Annex C; see also notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
146 Record of Understandings Reached by the Cotton Textiles Committee (Jan. 29-Feb.
9, 1962) para. 2, reprinted in GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 11th Supp. 40 (1963).
147 Id. at para. 27.
148 Id. at para. 28.
149 K. DAM, supra note 11, at 307-08; Metzger, Injury and Market Disruption from
Imports in 1 U.S. COMM'N INT'L TRADE & INVESTMENT POL'Y, UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 167 (1971) [hereinafter cited as the Wn.-
LIAMS REPORT].
I Long-term Arrangement, supra note 140, at art. 4.
1" See GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 19th Supp. 48 (1973).
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faced under Article XIX.15 2 The argument is that the term "sharp and
substantial increase" as well as the price and damage criteria have been
interpreted rather liberally in order to justify restraint measures even
when the changes resulted mainly from internal factors.153 At least in the
case of the United States, the implementation of such restrictions had
been facilitated by the overzealous categorization of textile products.1 '
The developing countries had not been able to diversify their exports to
the extent that would have been necessary to shift their production from
one category to another. This left some categories underutilized while
others had been restricted. Thus the exporting countries never realized
the expansion of exports as envisaged by the LTA. 55
Further, these restrictions (or threats thereof) have been used by the
importing countries to press for bilateral export restraint agreements with
the exporting countries.51 As a result, the major importing countries suc-
ceeded in replacing the provisions of the LTA and in reducing the multi-
lateral surveillance with.a bilateral imbalance in favor of their stronger
economies. While exporting countries were also required to restrict their
exports, the importing countries were able to intensify investment in their
domestic textile industry instead of phasing out inefficient industries. As
a result, the importing countries succeeded in preserving or strengthening
their production structure, thus threatening the very export potential of
the developing countries.
1 57
The United States, on the other hand, charged the exporting coun-
tries with refusing to ensure an orderly development of trade. They were
accused of not limiting their exports and of permitting the circumvention
of export restraints by transshipments and third-country transactions. 58
In spite of this heavy criticism,1 59 the LTA was extended60 until the
"I See GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 12th Supp. 68 (1964); K. DAM, supra note 11, at
312;
I.. Id. at 311-12; G. PATTERSON, supra note 127, at 314.
15 GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 13th Supp. 56 (1965); G. PATrmrSON, supra note 127, at
314.
GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 12th Supp. 66, 68 (1964); GATT, BISD, supra note 6,
13th Supp. 56 (1965); K. DAM, supra note 9, at 311-12; G. PATrERSON, supra note 127, at
314; Metzger, supra note 149, at 180.
1 6 K. DAM, supra note 11, at 307-08; G. PATTEMON, supra note 127, at 313.
187 GATT, BISD, supra note 6, at 14th Supp. 67, 77 (1966); Metzger, supra note 149, at
180.
188 K. DAM, supra note 11, at 309.
1 See GAT, BISD, supra note 6, 15th Supp. 125 (1968); GATT, BISD, supra note 6,
16th Supp. 30 (1969); GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 17th Supp. 46 (1970); GATT, BISD,
supra note 6, 19th Supp. 148 (1973).
160 The first extension of the Long-term Arrangement occurred in 1967. Protocol Ex-
tending the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles, done May 1,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 1337, T.I.A.S. No. 6289, reprinted in GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 15 Supp.
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Multi-Fibre Arrangement entered into force in January 1974.61
c. The Multi-Fibre Arrangement
The Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) was negotiated under the aus-
pices of GATT as were its predecessors, the LTA and the STA. Several
factors contributed to its establishment, most importantly the mutual
dissatisfaction of the developing countries with the LTA.'62
The developing countries regarded the LTA as too restrictive in light
of their export needs and were particularly dissatisfied with the easy im-
plementation of discriminatory trade barriers by the industrialized coun-
tries under the procedures of the LTA. 65 The industrialized countries in
turn did not feel their markets were effectively protected from import
disruption. 164 The developing countries preferred a newly negotiated pro-
tectionism approach in order to offset the likelihood of uncontrolled pro-
tectionism by the developed countries, while the latter agreed to the com-
promise in order to promote the concept of orderly marketing.165
The novel features of the MFA are: first, the more detailed definition
of "market disruption" in Annex A of the Agreement; 66 second, the more
elaborate safeguard system under Articles 3 through 6 and Annex B;'6 '
and third, the establishment of the Textiles Surveillance Body (TSB)
which essentially performs surveillance and dispute settlement func-
56 (1968). The second extension was done in 1970. Protocol Extending the Arrangement
Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles, done June 15, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 1970,
T.I.A.S. No. 6940, reprinted in GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 18th Supp. 18 (1972).
"I Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, done Dec. 20, 1973, 25
U.S.T. 1001, T.I.A.S. No. 7840, reprinted in GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 21st Supp. 3 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Multi-Fibre Arrangement].
162 See Perlow, The Multilateral Supervison of International Trade: Has the Textiles
Experiment Worked?, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 93, 100 (1981).
163 See supra notes 152-157 and accompanying text.
'6 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
161 See Perlow, supra note 162, at 100-01 n.32; Taake & Weiss, The World Textile
Arrangement: The Exporter's Viewpoint, 8 J. WORLD TRADE L. 624, 636-27, 650-52 (1974).
The Multi-Fibre Arrangement embodies the fundamental balance struck between the inter-
ests of the exporting (developing) countries and their importing (developed) counterparts.
Article 1 provides:
Itihe basic objectives shall be to achieve the expansion of trade, the reduction of
barriers to such trade and the progressive liberalization of world trade in textile
products, while at the same time ensuring the orderly and equitable development
of this trade and avoidance of distruptive effects in individual markets and on
individual lines of production in both importing and exporting countries.
Multi-Fibre Arrangement, supra note 161, at art. 1(2).
Another factor contributing to the Multi-Fibre Arrangement was the emergence of
synthetic fibres. See Taake & Weiss, supra note 165 at 626.
166 Multi-Fibre Arrancgement, supra note 161, at Annex A.
167 Id. at arts. 3-6 & Annex B.
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ARTICLE XIX
tions.16 The MFA appears to be sound as a whole, based upon more de-
tailed rules and more thorough consideration of the needs of developing
countries."6 9
The determination of what constitutes market disruption is, in virtu-
ally every respect, more detailed and comprehensive than the previous
definitions and requires "an examination of the appropriate factors hav-
ing a bearing on the evolution of the state of the industry in question
such as: turnover, market share, profits, export performance, employ-
ment, volume of disruptive and other imports, production, utilization of
capacity, and productivity and investments.1 0
The "sharp and substantial price increase" criterion has been refined
by requiring that the "increase shall be a measurable one and shall not be
determined to exist on the basis of allegation, conjecture or mere possibil-
ity arising ... from the existence of production capacity in the exporting
countries.
17 1
The "price differential" criterion includes more workable terminology
by providing for a price comparison "at comparable stages of commercial
transaction, and with the prices which normally prevail for such products
sold in the ordinary course of trade... in the importing country. 17 2 Fi-
nally, the MFA definition refers especially to the interests of the export-
ing country with respect to its "stage of development, the importance of
the textile sector to the economy," and other economic key factors such
as trade balance and balance of payments.1 7
3
The mechanism of implementing safeguards and the principles gov-
erning such action have been considerably refined. If an importing coun-
try believes its market is being disrupted, it must consult with the export-
ing country concerned with a view toward removing such disruption. At
the same time, detailed information on the reasons and justifications for
I" Id. at art. 11.
leg See, e.g., id. at art. 1(2) (which refers to the "avoidance of disruptive effects ... in
both importing and exporting countries"), art. 1(3) (which considers as "a principal aim...
to further the economic and social development of developing countries and secure a sub-
stantial increase in their export earnings from textile products and to provide scope for a
greater share for them in world trade in these products"); see also id. art. 6(1)-(4) (on the
special situation of developing exporting countries).
The rule oriented approach of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement is evident in the elaborate
safeguard system and the precise criteria for the determination of "market disruption." See
id. at Annex A. This makes international trade for all participating countries more predict-
able and, in the case of trade disputes, protects the weaker participants from the imposition
of "solutions" by the stronger trading partners.
170 Id. at Annex A(I).
7 Id. at Annex A(II)(i).
172 Id. at Annex A(II)(ii).
"7 Id. at Annex A(III).
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the safeguard request shall be furnished to the TSB. 1 4
If no such agreement arises out of the consultations within 60 days,
the importing country may nevertheless impose import restrictions.
These restrictions have to conform to the provisions of Annex B which
determines the level beyond which imports or exports of textile products
may not be restrained.17 5 In emergency cases the importing country may
impose restriction at a higher level and without prior consultation.17 6
Such emergency situations exist in "highly unusual and critical circum-
stances, where imports of a textile product or products during the period
of sixty days .. .would cause serious market disruption giving rise to
damage difficult to repair.' In any case, the matter must be reported
immediately to the TSB which makes appropriate recommendations and
forwards these recommendations to the GATT Textiles Committee. 1 8
In imposing safeguards, the importing country must consider imports
from all sources and seek to preserve a proper standard of equity. 7 9 Fur-
thermore it must endeavor to avoid discriminatory measures in situations
where market disruption is caused by imports from more than one ex-
porting country. 80 If, under Article 3, safeguards are unavoidable they
must be implemented in accordance with the provisions of Article 6.18'
These provisions emphasize the dependency of developing countries on
the textile trade and urge more favorable treatment of developing
countries. 82
Restraint measures may not exceed one year. However, they can be
renewed or extended. 83 Bilateral restraint agreements, however, may be
concluded for periods in excess of one year."" Safeguard measures are to
be kept under review and the progress in eliminating such measures must
be reported to the TSB. 85
Article 4 permits the conclusion of bilateral restraint agreements in-
1:74 Id. at art. 3(3).
75 Id. at art. 3(5).
:76 Id. at art. 3(6).
77 Id. at art. 3(6). Annex B. establishes the preceding 12 months as the reference pe-
riod for restraints. Id. at Annex B(1). It further provides that the level of imports must be
raised by not less than six percent annually, if restraints last longer than one year. Id. at
Annex B(2). This six percent floor refers to the Multi-Fibre Arrangement as it stood prior to
its extension in 1981. During the extension negotiations, European textile lobbies pressed
for a reduced guaranteed import level. See Perlow, supra note 162, at 112-13 n.86.
178 Multi-Fibre Arrangement, supra note 161, at art. 3(5) (iii) & (6).
179 Id. at art. 3(2).
180 Id.
81 Id.
182 Id. at art. 6(1)-(4).
183 Id. at art. 3(8).
:84 Id.
11 Id. at art. 3(9).
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ARTICLE XIX
sofar as they are consistent with the basic objectives and principles of the
Agreement.8 6 The full details of these agreements, which must be more
lenient than Article 3 restrictions, must be reported to the TSB.187 The
TSB then makes recommendations as it deems appropriate.""8 The TSB's
surveillance function on bilateral restraints helps to ensure the commit-
ment to multilaterality endorsed by the participating countries.'89 Finally,
the categorization of textile products, a much criticized feature of the
LTA, must be avoided under Article 5.190
The TSB constitutes a unique institutional innovation in interna-
tional trade agreements. For the first time in the field of international
commercial relations, an independent standing body consisting of nine
experts is vested with wide ranging surveillance and conciliatory pow-
ers. 191 It has been said that the TSB "represents a mixture of political
and judicial elements."' 12 Although its members are also official repre-
sentatives of the main signatory countries, the TSB does in fact operate
in an overall objective manner.193 Its functions can be summarized as fol-
lows: first, to conduct annual reviews and report on all textile restrictions
maintained by the MFA members; second, to determine whether re-
straints or quotas are justified on grounds of market disruption; third, to
make recommendations to participating countries in the event of a break-
down or dispute in bilateral negotiations. 94
The first function of the TSB primarily concerns reviewing and re-
porting on specific actions of the participating countries as opposed to
that of the Textiles Committee, which mainly conducts general reviews.'19
The second function of the TSB is to determine on an ex post facto basis,
whether Article 3 restraints are in compliance with the provisions of the
:86 Id. at art. 4(2).
"' Id. at art. 4(3).
19 Id. at art. 4(4).
189 Id. at art. 4(2).
190 Id. at art. 5.
191 Id. at art. 11.
'92 Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement after the Tokyo-Round: An Unfinished Busi-
ness, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145, 168 (1980).
193 Id. The United States, the EEC, and Japan seem to have "de facto" permanent
seats. Other seats traditionally are reserved to a *cotton exporting country (India, Pakistan,
Egypt), a Latin American country, and a Far Eastern country. Perlow, supra note 162, at
104.
19, Sarna, Safeguards Against Market Disruption-The Canadian View, 10 J. WORLD
TRADE. L. 355, 361 (1976).
191 Perlow, supra note 162, at 105. The Textiles Committee was established in a provi-
sional form first under the STA. Its members are all signatory countries to the Multi-Fibre
Arrangement. The Committee operates under GATT auspices and the GATT Director-Gen-
eral serves traditionally as the chairman. See id. at 103.
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MFA. 9 6 Although the justifications behind bilateral Article 4 restraints
were not initially subject to examination, the TSB unilaterally expanded
its power by declaring that these bilateral restraints must conform to the
Agreement. 197 Neither type of restraint, however, has been found
unjustified.'98
This reluctance may be attributed to the informal character of the
TSB's recommendations. The recommendations are usually determined
by consensus and lack any legally binding effect.199 Thus, "[p]articipating
countries shall endeavor to accept in full the recommendations of the
Textiles Surveillance Body."' 0 0 Nevertheless, the TSB's recommendations
have considerable moral influence on governmental decisions.2 01
The only major dispute on the TSB's authority arose under Article 2.
The EEC took advantage of Article 2, paragraph 2(i) which provides for
special programs in order to phase out previously established quantitative
restrictions. The EEC's programs were publicized well after the required
deadline and, in addition, they appeared to be in violation of the provi-
sions of Article 2.202 The TSB recommended that the EEC review these
programs with a view toward eliminating the violative restrictions.203 The
EEC retorted by charging the TSB with overstepping its authority and
clarified its understanding of the TSB as a conciliatory rather than arbi-
tral or judicial body.20 4 This does not correspond with the actual provi-
sions of the MFA, most notably Articles 3 and 4. These provisions require
the TSB to review agreements and, in the case of Article 3 restraints,
even to investigate their justification.2 0 5 The controversy, however, pro-
duced a more cautions TSB and a comparable dispute did not occur
again.20
6
To some extent the effectiveness of the supervisory functions of the
TSB has been hampered by overdue and inadequate information on im-
portant points. 0 7 In the field of dispute settlement, the TSB avoided
playing an active role, and wherever feasible it recommended continued
bilateral consultations. 2 8 This attitude corresponds to the fine balance
196 Multi-Fibre Arrangement, supra note 161, at arts. 3(4), 5(i) & (iii), 6.
191 See Perlow, supra note 162, at 117.
198 Id. at 117 n.107.
'99 Id. at 106.
200 Multi-Fibre Arrangement, supra note 161, at art. 11(8).
"0' Sarna, supra note 194, at 361.
202 See Perlow, supra note 162, at 109.
203 Id. at 110.
204 Id.
201 See, e.g., Multi-Fibre Arrangement, supra note 161, at arts. 3(4) & (5) (iii), 4(4); see
also Perlow, supra note 162, at 110-11.
201 See Perlow, supra note 162, at 111-12.
2'0 See id. at 120-21.
209 See id. at 121.
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ARTICLE XIX
between legal and political credibility which the TSB must accommo-
date. 0 9 The overall performance of the TSB has therefore been regarded
as satisfactory.21 0
Analysis of the operation of the MFA reveals criticism similar to that
levied against the LTA.211 However, the MFA still represents a multilat-
eral approach to textile trade which is preferred over bilateral solutions.
Accordingly, most countries acknowledged at a major review of the Agree-
ment that: "the Arrangement had marked a significant advance in inter-
national co-operation in textile trade policy and that it had provided a
delicately balanced framework within which the special problems of tes-
tiles trade could be discussed and solved. The objectives of the Arrange-
ment remained valid despite some problems regarding its
implementation.
' '122
These problems of implementation occur mainly concerning the de-
termination of market disruption, the central part of the MFA frame-
work. With continuing practice of the Arrangement, charges have been
made by exporting countries that safeguard measures under Article 3
have been taken by importing countries without the clear evidence of
market disruption required by Annex A.213 In addition, the measures have
fallen short of the minimum mandatory import levels specified in Annex
B. 21 4 Also it is argued that it was "too often taken for granted that low-
priced imports from developing countries are assumed to be disrup-
tive."21 5 Moreover the record revealed a proliferation of bilateral restraint
agreements that often concluded under the threat of unilateral
restrictions.2"'
Many countries therefore felt the need to reconsider the legal basis of
the Arrangement. The MFA does constitute a deviation from GATT, but
they are reconciled by the equivocal declaration in the Preamble of the
MFA toward full regard for principles of GATT objectives.211
209 Id. at 123.
210 Id. at 131.
2" See supra notes 152-159 and accompanying text for a review of the criticism levelled
against the LTA.
22 GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 24th Supp. 38 (1978).
212 GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 23d Supp. 22-23 (1977); GATT, BISD, supra note 6,
24th Supp. 34 (1978).
214 GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 23d Supp. (1977).
215 GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 24th Supp. 34 (1978).
216 GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 24th Supp. 35 (1978); see also Curzon, Neo-Ptotection-
ism, the MFA and the European Community, 4 WORLD EcoN. 251, 255 (1981) (discussing
the concept of "reasonable departures" which the European Community advocated during
the extension negotiations in 1977).
217 Multi-Fibre Arrangement, supra note 161, at preamble, consideration 8. The Multi-
Fibre Arrangement deviates from GATT principles in two fundamental ways; it embraces
discriminatory trade restrictions and allows quotas rather than tariffs to curb imports. See
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The MFA was extended twice, in 1977218 and in 1981 until 1986.2"9
The first extension has resulted in a more restrictive agreement by pro-
viding more latitude for the developed importing countries to conclude
bilateral restraint agreements.22 0 Nevertheless, during the 1981 renegota-
tions the EEC took an even more protectionist stance and since it was
subsequently joined by the United States it achieved an accord which ap-
pears even more restrictive than the previous one.2 21 The restrictive char-
acter is exemplified by the provision that an importing country may con-
sider a drop in its domestic production as a reason for implementing
quotas on that item. This provision resembles the "recession clause"
which was, along with several alternatives to curb imports for domestic
reasons, a negotiating objective of the EEC.222 How restrictive the new
MFA will prove to be will depend on the outcome of the renegotiations of
various bilateral restraint agreements which have been concluded under
the authority of the MFA. In the case of the EEC these negotiations are
scheduled for 1982.225
2. Circumvention of Article XIX Outside the GATT Framework
The Japanese trade dispute and the operation of the Textile Ar-
rangements prompted various countries to resort to bilateral restraint
agreements. Basically, these restraints were requested by the importing
country to eliminate the threat of market disruption originating from im-
Curzon, supra note 216, at 259-60.
An interesting case regarding the relation between GATT and the Multi-Fibre Arrange-
ment involved the application of GATT Article XIX by Canada on textile and clothing
imports. The Textiles Committee noted that any contracting party signatory to the Multi-
Fibre Arrangement retained legal and formal right to invoke GATT articles. There was,
however, a divergence of views, first whether safeguard measures under GATT may be used
when their application nullifies the objectives of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement, and, second,
whether a contracting party must exhaust its rights under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement
before resorting to GATT provisions. GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 24th Supp. 44-48 (1978).
219 Protocol Extending the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles,
done Dec. 14, 1977, 29 U.S.T. 2287, T.I.A.S. No. 8939, reprinted in GATT, BISD, supra
note 4, 24th Supp. 5 (1978).
2'9 See World Textile Trade Accord is Reached, Providing More Latitude for Import
Curbs, Wall St. J., Dec. 23, 1981, at 14, col. 2.
220 Protocol Extending the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles,
supra note 218, at arts. 5(1) & (3). Article 5(3) provides for the jointly agreed "reasonable
departures" discussed in Curzon, supra note 155, at 255. See also Perlow, supra note 162, at
113-15.
22 See Curzon, supra note 216, at 255-59; World Textile Trade Accord is Reached,
Providing More Latitude for Import Curbs, Wall St. J., Dec. 23, 1981, at 14, col. 2.
222 World Textile Trade Accord is Reached Providing More Latitude for Import Curbs,
Wall St. J., Dec. 23, 1981, at 14, col. 2.
223 Id.
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ARTICLE XIX
ports of developing countries. The exporting countries agreed to the re-
straints to ensure orderly access to the markets of the industrialized
states and limited their exports "voluntarily" beyond the level they could
export under normal competitive conditions. 22' Indeed, the term "volun-
tary export restraint" is a misnomer since such action is often agreed to
only under the threat of unilateral quotas and these quotas might well
have a more detrimental impact on the exporting country.225 Thus, Hong
Kong, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Poland, Trinidad and To-
bago, and Yugoslavia have filed complaints under GATT about "volun-
tary" export restraints contending that such restrictions are only imple-
mented in order to avoid the imposition of even more stringent unilateral
import restrictions by the countries requesting the restraints. 226 Although
these agreements deal with the essential Article XIX issue, they are sub-
ject neither to direct GATT surveillance nor to GATT authority.227
a. Definitions and Procedural Aspects
Bilateral restraint agreements are usually discussed as "voluntary ex-
port restraints" (VERs) or "orderly marketing agreements" (OMAs).
However, the definition of such agreements may vary. A first and com-
monplace method of distinction rests upon the type of parties concerned.
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), VERs occur essentially as a result of bilateral negotiations
between industries in importing and exporting countries only with the
support of their governments. Their implementation is left to the indus-
try in the exporting country.228
In the case of OMAs, however, governmental intervention is explicit
and formal, with specific agreements being negotiated between exporting
and importing countries. 2 29
A second distinction derives from their different procedural require-
ments under U.S. law. The Trade Act of 1974 defines OMAs as "orderly
marketing agreements with foreign countries limiting the export from for-
eign countries and the import into the United States .... ,,230 They are
224 See UNCTAD, GROWING PROTECTIONISM AND THE STANDSTILL ON TRADE BARRIERS
AGAINST IMPORTS FROM DEVELOPING CouNREs 5, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.2/194 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as UNCTAD, GROWING PROTECTIONISM].
225 S. METZGER, LOWERING NONTARIFF BARRIERS 145 (1974).
" See D. ROBERTSON, supra note 30, at 26, 53.
227 For an overview of bilateral restraint agreements during the 1930's see Metzger,
supra note 149, at 167-83.
228 UNCTAD, GROWING PROTECTIONISM, supra note 224, at 6.
229 Id. at 9.
230 Pub. L. No. 93-618, §203, 88 Stat. 1978, 2015 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §2253(a)(4)
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
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treated in the Trade Act as an official import relief measure, along with
unilateral quantitative import restrictions.281 Accordingly, their negotia-
tion has to be preceded by an affirmative finding of injury to domestic
production by the ITC.23 2
VERs, on the other hand, are not legally authorized import relief
measures under U.S. law and thus are considered procedurally inferior.
The only statutory reference to VERs relates to the agricultural sector.2 s
They may be negotiated even between the Executive Branch and foreign
industries regardless of the provisions of the Trade Act.23 4 Usually, how-
ever, they are negotiated on an industry-by-industry basis when the ITC
has dismissed an escape clause application or the President has refused to
grant import relief despite an affirmative finding by the ITC2 3 5
Strict U.S. legislation played a role in promoting the proliferation of
VERs. Up to 1962, only 15 of 134 cases investigated by the Tariff Com-
mission led to the Presidential invocation of U.S. escape clause measures
under Article XIX.23s Nevertheless, with the Trade Expansion Act of
1962, Congress sharpened the requirements for import relief under U.S.
law.237 As a result there were no affirmative findings from 1962 to 1969,
and the positive findings before the 1974 legislation were few. 238 Although
Congress, under the Trade Act of 1974, liberalized escape clause law,239
until 1979 only 3 of 38 applications for import relief resulted in explicit
action under Article XIX. OMAs were negotiated in three additional
cases.
240
231 Id. at §2253(b)-(k) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
232 Id. at §2251(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
233 7 U.S.C. §1854 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
234 In Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975), the Court held that, although the Executive
Branch was involved in the negotiation of voluntary restraints with Japanese and European
steel industries, the negotiations did not constitute regulation of foreign commerce and con-
sequently did not violate the Constitution or the Trade Expansion Act. Id. at 143. See Re-
cent Decision, Presidential Authority to Negotiate Voluntary Export Restraint Arrange-
ments with Foreign Producers-Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 7 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 905 (1975).
'31 Bhagwati, supra note 89, at 1000-01. Bhagwati shows, in the case of Japan, how
industries which failed to win protection under the U.S. escape clause proceeded to secure
VERs on the imports from Japan.
236 Id. at 993-97.
217 Pub. L. No. 87-794, §401(b)(1), Stat. 872, 884 (1962); see also Metzger, The Trade
Expansion Act of 1962, 51 GEo. L.J. 425 (1963).
28 Bhagwati, supra note 89, at 997; 1975 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM., ANN. REP. 12.
239 19 U.S.C. §2251(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); see also Ris, "Escape Clause" Relief
Under the Trade Act of 1974: New Standards, Same Results, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
297 (1977).
20 1976 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, ANN. REP. 4-5; 1977 id. at 6-7; 1978 id. 7-8; 1979 id.
at 6; GATT, ACTIVITIES IN 1976, at 74 (1977); Proclamation No. 4510, 3 C.F.R. 28 (1977);
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b. Economic Implications
VERs and OMAs tend to proliferate, and, more importantly, the vol-
ume of trade affected by them has increased.24 The fact that they escape
any international surveillance enhances their impact on international
trade.
One of the most important implications flows from their bilateral
character. They can be applied selectively in the sense that they are di-
rected only at those suppliers who are the most competitive, which in
many instances are developing countries. Due to the different bargaining
power in bilateral negotiations, VERs and OMAs favour the economically
stronger industrialized countries over the weaker developing countries.24 2
Since VERs and OMAs are applied selectively, they cause trade di-
version at the expense of the restraining countries. Imports from un-
restricted sources are likely to increase rapidly in order to fill the gap left
by the self-restraining exporting country. Consequently, third countries
benefit from the selective measures at the expense of the countries em-
ploying self-restraint. Since these third party beneficiaries sooner or later
are also confronted with the request to restrain their exports, VERs and
OMAs bear within themselves the seeds of their expansion to other
countries.243
Finally, VERs and OMAs lead to the cartelization of markets in both
importing and exporting countries. In the importing country's market
they tend to limit competition and raise prices.24 4 In the exporting coun-
try VERs are usually administered through some sort of licensing or
quota system which diminishes competition among producers of export
goods.2 5
c. Consistency with the Law of GATT
Under the law of GATT, VERs and OMAs raise questions with re-
spect to Articles XI and XIH. Article XI, which is aimed at the general
elimination of quantitative restrictions, provides that "[n]o prohibitions
or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made
Proclamation No. 4511, 3 C.F.R. 34 (1977).
"I UNCTAD, GROWING PROTECTIONISM, supra note 224, at 6 n.7.
242 Id. at 8.
243 This self-perpetuation effect attached in the textile market. See id. at 8; Bhagwati,
supra note 89, at 1007.
244 UNCTAD, GROWING PROTECTONISM, supra note 224, at 9. The implication of VERs
led to the challenge of the steel restraints in Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v.
Kissinger. See supra note 234 and authorities cited therein.
'15 D. ROBERTSON, supra note 30, at 26-27; Matsushita, Export Control and Export
Cartels in Japan, 20 HARv. INT'L L.J. 103 (1979) (discussing Japan's regulation of exports).
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effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures,
shall be instituted... on the importation. . or on the exportation...
of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting
party."2 4 Although the wording of the provision might indicate otherwise,
it is questionable whether it covers VERs and OMAs. The exception on
export restrictions in section 2(a) of the provision,2 47 as well as the inter-
pretative note of the corresponding Article of the Havana Charter,248 al-
low the conclusion that exports should not be restricted in cases where
the importing country has an interest in the unhampered supply of these
export items.2
49
In the case of VERs and OMAs, however, it is precisely the importing
country which requests the restrictions. Even if Article XI is regarded as
the principal provision prohibiting VERs and OMAs under GATT, com-
plaints would be very unlikely since the restrictions are imposed at the
request of the importing country. In fact, the importing country would be
the one affected by those restrictions. 2
50
The same reasoning applies to cases under Article Xm which pro-
vides for non-discriminatory administration of quantitative restrictions,
with respect to exportation as well as importation.25 1 Again, since it is the
importing country which is principally affected, but explicitly requests
the export restraints, complaints are unlikely to occur.
In conclusion, VERs and OMAs may be regarded as "illegal" under
GATT, but in any case they appear practically unassailable.252 Thus,
under GATT a quasi-legal distinction arose between "legal" import quo-
tas and "illegal" voluntary restraints, the latter not being subject to
GATT negotiations in a formal sense. Attempts to legalize the "illegal"
248 GATT, supra note 6, at XI(1).
24 7 "The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not extend to . .. [e]xport
prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of
foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting party." GATT, supra
note 6, at art. XI(2)(a).
218 The Interpretative Note to Article 20 of the Havana Charter states:
[I]n the case of products which are basic to diet in the exporting country and
which are subject to alternate annual shortages and surpluses, the provisions of
paragraph 2(a) do not preclude such export prohibitions or restrictions as are nec-
essary to maintain from year to year domestic stocks sufficient to avoid critical
shortages.
U.S. Dep't State, Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, supra note 7, at
63.
249 See J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 316-17 (discussing the relationship between Article
XI(2)(a) and the Havana Charter, Article 20); see also GATT, Analytical Index 51-52 (2d
rev. 1966).
250 GATT Provisions on Relief from Injurious Imports, supra note 85, at 125.
251 GATT, supra note 6, at art. XIII(1).
22 Tumlir, supra note 81, at 407.
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restrictions by submitting them to Article XIX consultation procedures
seem to be rather remote, since these measures were precisely developed
to circumvent Article XIX in its present form.253 In addition, the formal
recognition of bilateral restraint agreements in the framework of the
MFA constitutes a justification for their validity.
3. Summary and Conclusions on the Experience with Article XIX
With respect to the utilization of Article XIX, as well as its various
methods of circumvention, the deficiencies of the GATT escape clause
can be summarized. The first inadequacy lies in the vague determination
of the Article XIX requirements, particularly the "serious injury" defini-
tion. The definitional problems with the term "market disruption" con-
tinued and culminated after various attempts of GATT working parties
and the textile arrangements had failed to reach the most detailed defini-
tion used by the MFA. But experience under the MFA confirm that a
satisfactory definition still has not been reached and this suggests the dif-
ficulty in elaborating on an appropriate injury determination within the
framework of Article XIX.254 In addition, the causal requirements for a
safeguard action were virtually abandoned.
A second challenge occurred with growing bilateralism in the solu-
tions to Article XIX cases. With respect to the reasons pertaining to this
development, it has been pointed out by a GATT Secretariat member
that Article XIX appears at the same time "too exacting" and "too leni-
ent."255 The issue is further complicated by the impact of the two basic
principles of GATT, the most-favoured-nation treatment and reciprocity.
Article XIX appears "too exacting," because the country invoking
the escape clause must pay dearly for the emergency action in the form of
either compensatory concessions made to the affected countries or retalia-
tory trade measures imposed by the affected countries.25
Precisely at this point the principles of MFN treatment and reciproc-
ity are involved. As it has been shown, the safeguard measure under Arti-
cle XIX must be imposed on a non-discriminatory basis.257 In other
words, all countries according to the MFN principle must be treated
equally. This implies that the compensatory concessions themselves have
to comply with the MFN principle, just as the safeguard action does.2 5 8 In
brief, all countries being adversely affected must be compensated, thus
253 Id.
254 For a discussion of the MFA definition of "market disruption" and the criticisms
levelled at it, see supra notes 170-73, 213 and accompanying text.
255 Tumlir, supra note 81, at 106.
256 Id. at 406.
257 See supra note 77 & 78 and accompanying text.
258 Tumlir, supra note 81, at 406; Meier, supra note 85, at 496.
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requiring "substantially equivalent" concessions to be made on the basis
of reciprocity.
The impossibility of parties agreeing on extensive equivalent conces-
sions will in many instances cause retaliatory measures imposed by all
non-compensated countries on the basis of reciprocity. The problem,
however, remains the same: the more countries affected by safeguard re-
strictions which go uncompensated, the more retaliatory trade measures
should be expected by the country invoking Article XIX.
Since the country confronted with serious injury to its industry can
foresee and calculate these developments, it will seek a solution to the
problem outside the framework of Article XIX and enter into bilateral
restraint agreements. 59 These agreements do not usually require any
compensation at all, since the countries requesting them are mostly in-
dustrialized countries. They are, in terms of bargaining power, much bet-
ter off in bilateral agreements than the developing countries. Conse-
quently, the implication of MFN treatment and reciprocity on Article
XIX actions enhances the proliferation of bilateral restraints in circum-
vention of the GATT rules.
Often, Article XIX appears "too lenient"; the principle of reciprocity
is also involved here. Article XIX authorizes safeguard measures to be
maintained "for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such
injury. ' 60 The safeguard measure may be maintained as long as the
threatening export capacities exist abroad. Furthermore the settlement
procedures of Article XIX constitute a bias in favour of the permanent
establishment of the emergency measure.2 61 Since compensatory conces-
sion or retaliatory withdrawal, made on the basis of reciprocity, settles
the dispute, the safeguard restriction remains in existence unsanc-
tioned.262 Without reciprocal bargaining the import restrictions would
probably not be lifted again. In fact reciprocal bargaining is just as un-
likely, since the countries already restricted would not accept additional
disadvantages in order to have the restriction abolished.
Consequently, the countries which were affected by safeguard actions
also preferred external solutions in the form of bilateral restraint agree-
ments. These bilateral agreements required periodic renewal and thus
were negotiable with respect to the period of restraint. In addition, they
offered bargaining opportunities on the overall level of restraint. For this
reason countries threatened by more stringent unilateral safeguard mea-
259 See supra notes 224-227 and accompanying text.
260 GATT, supra note 4, at art. XIX(1)(a); see Appendix A for the full text of Article
XIX.
262 Tumlir, supra note 81, at 406.
262 Id.
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sures also preferred the bilateral restraints. 6 3
III. ARTICLE XIX REFORM DURING THE TOKYO ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
Based on the negative experiences with Article XIX, a major reform
was in order. A simple collective decision under GATT would not make it
possible to reassert the Article XIX rationale as it stood before the Tokyo
Round.26 4 On the contrary, recent economic upheavals made revision of
Article XIX more necessary than ever before.265 The constant circumven-
tions of Article XIX revealed a general reluctance of the contracting par-
ties to comply with firm rules of trade law. According to an observer, Ar-
ticle XIX "appears to be more honored in the breach than in the
observance. ' '266 The overall legal "spirit" of GATT affairs "risks being
swallowed up by the prevailing anti-legal attitudes. '267 With respect to
the Article XIX negotiations the subject was recalled by the then Direc-
tor-General of GATT when he stressed the need for the "reaffirmation of
the rule of law in international trade. '26  In international trade this state-
ment implies the need for greater reliance on firm rules. Essentially all
safeguard measures must be subject to international surveillance with
mutually agreed upon criteria and procedures.26 In order to eliminate ac-
tions outside the GATT, the criteria and procedures of Article XIX had
to be redefined. Technically, the reform was achieved through the devel-
opment of a supplementary code to Article XIX, as was done with respect
to other GATT provisions during the Tokyo Round. 70 This supplemen-
tary code had to cover some specific issues.
At the top of the agenda stood the need for an effective definition of
"serious injury."2711 The second and most important issue concerned the
question of whether safeguard measures should be applied on a discrimi-
natory or non-discriminatory basis. 7 2 The MFN requirement caused the
circumvention of the escape clause through bilateral restraints. Therefore
283 See Bergsten, On the Non-Equivalence of Import Quotas and "Voluntary" Export
Restraints in TOWARD A NEW WORLD TRADE POLICY: THE MAIDENHEAD PAPERS 239, 244, 246,
247 (C. Bergsten ed. 1975).
2 Tumlir, supra note 81, at 405-06.
201 Id. at 406.
266 Meier, supra note 85, at 499.
167 R. HUDEC, supra note 11, at 268.
26 Long, International Trade Under Threat: A Constructive Response, 1 WORLD
ECON. 251, 257 (1978).
269 Id. at 258.
270 See 10. LONG, supra note 2, at 90-95. For a proposal on the form of the "Supple-
mentary code" see D. ROBERTSON, supra note 30, at 61-65.
271 10. LONG, supra note 2, at 94.
272 Id.
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some countries believed that the MFN principle should be eliminated. A
third issue concerned the preferential treatment of developing countries
under Article XIX actions.2 3 One of the developing countries' demands
was to be exempted from safeguard measures imposed by industrialized
countries.
A further problem was created by proposals concerning mandatory
adjustment assistance.274 Industrialized countries faced demands to shift
their less competitive industries into other lines of economic activity. It
was essential to the developing countries that safeguard measures be
firmly accompanied by adjustment assistance measures. These measures
should not be used merely as protectionist devices which only ensure the
existence and expansion of non-competitive industries.
In addition, all future cases of emergency protection should be placed
on a legal basis.2 75 A potential safeguard code must be so comprehensive
that it prevents the negotiation of future bilateral restraints and elimi-
nates the already existing "voluntary" export restraints. Finally, procedu-
ral questions of multilateral surveillance and dispute settlement under
Article XIX had to be solved in order to provide a workable basis for the
implementation of future safeguard actions. 27
Despite the importance of a safeguard code, the first substantial ne-
gotiations occurred only at the end of the Tokyo Round.2 77 By early 1979,
however, the nations' positions on the major problems remained as far
apart as ever, particularly those on selectivity and preferential treatment
of developing countries. A draft code by the GATT Secretariat also
proved unsuccessful in overcoming the deadlock.2 78 Finally the planned
code on safeguards was eliminated from the whole Tokyo Round package
which was passed in May of 1979.17 The safeguard code was the subject
of further negotiations which, as a matter of urgency, should have con-
cluded by mid-July of 1979. An agreement was not reached, however, and
the negotiations were postponed to the fall of 1979.2"0
In November of 1979 negotiations resumed at the Annual Trade
Talks of the "CONTRACTING PARTIES" and were submitted to a
273 Id. at 94-95.
274 Id. at 95.
217 Id. at 94.
276 Id.
27 Id. at 92.
271 Id. at 153. The "draft code" was printed under the title Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions: Group Safeguards, GATT Doc. MTN/SGIN/47 (Apr. 11, 1979) (copy on file at Jour-
nal office) [hereinafter cited as Draft Safeguard Code].
217 Proc~s-Verbal, done Apr. 11, 1979, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. -, reprinted in
GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 26th Supp. 189 (1980) & 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 577 (1979).
280 See GATT Press Release, GATT/1234 (Apr. 12, 1979), reprinted in 18 INr'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 553 (1979).
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newly created committee which had to report on the issue by June
1980.281 In addition, a subcommittee on the Committee on Trade and De-
velopment was set up to examine any future protective actions by devel-
oped countries against imports from developing countries.28 2 However,
one year after the conclusion of the Tokyo Round in Geneva, the safe-
guard talks were still at a stalemate and were regarded as one of the fail-
ures of the Tokyo Round. The importance of a safeguard code was de-
scribed by the then GATT General-Director, Oliver Long. Long said that
"the outcome will colour the final judgment on the Tokyo Round as a
whole. 28 3
A. The Determination of "Serious Injury"
The determination of "serious injury" was viewed uniformly as a ne-
cessity for reform. Early experience had already revealed the deficiencies
of the "serious injury" criteria. Subsequently, under the MFA, efforts
have been made to substitute the term with "market disruption." The
MFA definition of "market disruption" can be regarded as the most use-
ful model for potential Article XIX reform. Nevertheless the "market dis-
ruption" definition especially emphasizes, as did all other attempts, the
price level of the imports.2 " The developing countries, however, were
relunctant to adopt a definition similar to that of the MFA. They were
the first targets of safeguard action because their products were simply
produced on a lower cost level which in turn created the comparative
price advantage. Moreover, the term required clarification of which kind
of situation created a threat of serious injury and the criteria to be con-
sidered in determining the causal link between imports and injury.2 8 5
Accordingly, many arguments raised in the MFA negotiations were
reiterated. Although the draft code on safeguards included many aspects
of the MFA's position, it was liberalized considerably by abandoning
price references. 288 According to the draft code the determination of a
serious injury must be made on the basis of "positive findings of fact and
not mere conjecture, or remote hypothetical possibility."'2 7
The positive findings of fact should be based on the "examination of
281 GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 26th Supp. 202 (1980).
282 GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 26th Supp. 219 (1980).
2 GATT Press Release, GATT/1237 (May 15, 1979); see generally 10. LONG, supra
note 2, at 90-95.
28 Multi-Fibre Arrangement, supra note 161, at Annex A(II) (ii); see supra note 171
and accompanying text.
285 10. LONG, supra note 2, at 94.
288 See Draft Safeguard Code, supra note 278, at 4-5.
2'7 Draft Safeguard Code, supra note 278, at 4. Where serious injury is only threatened,
the determination will be made when such injury is "clearly imminent." Id.
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objective factors . . . such as: actual and potential decline in output,
turnover, market share, profits, exports, utilization of productive capac-
ity, productivity, factors affecting domestic prices, actual and potential
negative effects on inventories, domestic employment and wages, and in-
vestment."218 The similarity of these factors to the MFA definition in An-
nex A, sec. I is striking.28 9
With respect to the causal relationship between imports and injury,
the draft code abandons the price criterion referred to in the MFA Annex
A, sec. II (ii)290 In fact, the draft code explicitly provides that "no imports
shall be discriminated against on the grounds of low costs or low
prices. 
'29 1
The draft code explicitly refers to the effect of factors other than
imports on the domestic producers and provides that such factors may
not be attributed to the injury determination. 292 The code lists other fac-
tors which include: "competition among domestic producers, contraction
in demand due to substitution by other products or changes in consumer
tastes, decline in domestic consumption or production, shifts in technol-
ogy, structural deficiencies or loss of competitive advantage.
293
In spite of these efforts, problems remain. Article XIX was also ap-
plicable in cases of relative import increases. This "relative" standard is
an extremely protective device, and in the case of a worldwide recession
only deepens the economic crisis.2 94 If domestic production grows at a
lower rate than competitive imports do, the requirement of a relative im-
port increase is satisfied and trade barriers can be imposed. However, the
draft code continues to assert the relative standard.2 5 Moreover, aggrega-
tion of the key economic variables into a conclusive formula would be
difficult. This realization must not be understood as disregard for the at-
tempts at clarification, but rather reveals that the determination of seri-
ous injury continues to be a matter of statistically based evidence, the
evaluation of which is still subject to manipulation and discretionary
judgment.9 8
288 Id.
289 See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
'90 Compare Draft Safeguard Code, supra note 278, at 4 with Multi-Fibre Arrange-
ment, supra note 161, at Annex A(II) (ii).
"I Draft Safeguard Code, supra note 278, at 11.
292 Id. at 5.
293 Id.
294 See J. JACKSON, supra note 558-59.
29 The Code states: "[In the case of serious injury such a determination shall be made
only when imports have increased ... in such quantities relative to domestic production
* . . as to cause serious injury sustained by domestic producers." Draft Safeguard Code,
supra note 278, at 4.
29 See D. ROBERTSON, supra note 29, at 56.
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The draft code places the burden for conducting the investigation to
determine a serious injury or a threat thereof upon the domestic authori-
ties concerned.9 This inquiry must be conducted in conjunction with the
guidelines and criteria specified by a potential safeguard code. Neverthe-
less, any contracting party may request the Committee on Safeguards. 8
to examine any safeguard measure which "is affecting, or is likely to af-
fect, its trade interest.
'
"
2 99
The substantive and procedural similarities of the determination of
"serious injury" under the draft code on safeguards and under U.S. law
invite some remarks on the U.S. escape clause.300
Procedurally, the first step is the filing of a petition for import relief
with the International Trade Commission (ITC) which conducts the in-
vestigation.30 1 The ITC determines, "whether an article is being imported
into the United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial
cause of serious injury, or threat thereof, to the domestic industry pro-
ducing an article like or directly competitive with the imported article."
30 2
In determining "serious injury" and "substantial cause" the ITC
must follow certain quidelines. Factors indicating a "serious injury" in-
clude: "the significant idling of productive facilities in the industry, the
inability of a significant number of firms to operate at a reasonable level
of profit, and significant unemployment or underemployment within an
industry.' 30 3 Moreover, relatively increased imports fulfill the require-
ment of "such increased quantities" under the escape clause.3 04 Finally, a
substantial cause "means a cause which is important and not less than
297 Draft Safeguard Code, supra note 278, at 4. It is interesting that the countries which
have invoked Article XIX most frequently-Australia, Canada, and the United
States-already have domestic bodies charged with the duty to conduct public inquiries on
the justification of import relief measures. The United States has the International Trade
Commission, Australia has the Industries Assistance Commission, and Canada has the Tex-
tile and Clothing Board as well as the Anti-Dumping Tribunal. See D. ROBERTSON, supra
note 30, at 62 n.92; Sarna, supra note 194, at 362-368.
299 The Committee on Safeguards is established under the draft safeguard code and is
composed of representatives of each of the contracting parties. Draft Safeguard Code, supra
note 278, at 22.
299 Id.
200 See 19 U.S.C. §§2251-2253 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
301 Id. at §2251(a)(1) (1976).
202 Id. at §2251(b)(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). This is the United States "escape
clause". If the ITC recommends import relief, the President is supposed to provide such
relief either in the form of a tariff increase, the imposition of a tariff-quota or a quantitia-
tive restriction, an orderly marketing agreement, or any combination of such actions, unless
such action is not in the national economic interest of the United States. Id. at §§
2252(a)(1)(A), 2253(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
203 Id. at §2251(b)(2)(A) (1976).
304 Id. at §2251(b)(2)(C).
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any other cause." 30 5
The statutory criteria of a serious injury under the Trade Act are less
detailed than those established by the MFA and the draft GATT safe-
guard code. However, the causal link between imports and injury must be
substantial under U.S. law as opposed to the draft GATT code and the
MFA. The draft code only refers to a series of factors which may not be
attributed to the impact of imports.306 Under U.S. law the ITC considers
all causes for the injury and subsequently ranks the imports among these
causes. If the increased imports contributed not less than any other
cause, it must then be determined whether they constitute an important
cause. If the increased imports are only one of several causes of injury,
their importance may be doubted. But, if they represent one out of two
causes, the increased imports will presumably be deemed "important."90
The U.S. experience reveals the complexity of the determination of a
serious injury. 08 The Commission s 9 elaborated case-by-case criteria akin
to those defined by the draft safeguard code for the determination of a
serious injury. The criteria developed by the Commissioners include: a
decline in output and profits, a decline in the number of firms in the
industry, a rise in unemployment in the industry in questidn, the underu-
tilization of productive capacity, and other pertinent factors.3 10 In spite of
the search for more indicative criteria, the investigations have frequently
been made on a rather superficial basis.3 11 To some extent these ad hoc
decisions stemmed from the "truly fuzzy nature of the injury concept"3 12
which invites policy considerations unrelated to the increased imports.
For example, an injury investigation regarding the footwear industry has
been described as follows:
[t]he industry is composed of a very large number of small producers
who lack adequate financial resources and are otherwise ill equipped to
adjust to the rapid proliferation of new styles and material, increased
imports from low-wage countries, changing technology, new marketing
techniques and a cost-price squeeze of impressive proportions ....
Even if footwear supplies from abroad is [sic] ignored, the problems of
305 Id. at §2251(b)(4).
306 See supra notes 292-293 and accompanying text.
307 See Ris, supra note 239, at 306.
308 Although there are considerable differences between the U.S. escape clause criteria
under the prior and present trade legislation, the fact-finding process remains unchanged.
309 The term "Commission" refers to both the Tariff Commission and its successor, the
International Trade Commission.
310 See Adams & Dirlam, Import Competition and the Trade Act of 1974: A Case
Study of Section 201 and its Interpretation by The International Trade Commission, 52
IND. L.J. 535, 554-58 (1977).
311 Id. at 559.
312 Id. at 554.
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the industry are monumental."'
The critical point is that the smaller firms of the industry appear
uncompetitive "even in the absence of imports. Their protection from im-
ports can be justified politically, but not economically. Similar policy con-
siderations were involved in the Speciality Steel Case, where the refer-
ence data had been taken only from the recession period of 1974 to
1975.314
A second reason for superficial investigation is the Commission's fail-
ure to use clear quantitative economic criteria. Data is often hard to ob-
tain. The limited period of time, as well as the lack of trained staff econo-
mists, contribute to the problems.3 15 Nevertheless, the lack of
quantitative techniques and empirical analysis in the work of the Com-
mission indicates that problems reach well beyond the definition of seri-
ous injury.311
These comments are not directed toward the achievement of clearer
definitions under the draft safeguard code, but rather toward a relevation
of the difficulties to be expected, particularly in countries which have no
experience with the serious injury concept on the domestic level.
B. Distriminatory versus Non-Discriminatory Application of Safe-
guards under Article XIX
1. The background of the dispute
The question of whether or not safeguard measures should be per-
mitted to apply selectively against the country causing the injury to do-
mestic producers, became the crux of the negotiations on safeguards. 17
The dispute involved the European Economic Community which was
supported by the Scandinavian countries on one side, with Japan and the
export oriented developing countries, such as South Korea, Hong Kong,
Taiwan, Singapore, Pakistan, India, Brazil, and Argentina, on the other
side.31 s
313 Id. at 556 (quoting Commissioner Leonard in NONRUBBER FooTwEAR, T.C. PUB. No.
359, at 47 (Jan. 1971)). The Commission found a threat of serious injury but did not grant
import relief. The President, however, did grant relief.
314 Adams & Dirlam, supra note 310, at 556-57. (discussing the Commission's finding of
serious injury in SPECIALrrY STEEL, U.S.I.T.C. PUB. No. 756 (Jan. 1976)). The authors ques-
tion the Commission's finding and the validity of the data on which it was based. Adams &
Dirlam, supra note 310, at 557.
Adams & Dirlam, supra note 310, at 558-59.
"~ Id. at 559-60, 577.
117 See R. KEMPER, THE TOKYO ROUND: REsuLTs AND IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRs 21 (World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 372, 1980); Curzon Price, Surplus Ca-
pacity and What the Tokyo Round Filed to Settle, 2 WORLD ECON. 305, 309-11 (1979).
"' Curzon Price, supra note 317, at 313.
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The European Community stressed selective safeguard measures and
argued that Article XIX should be maintained as it stood since it would
not explicitly exclude selective safeguard measures. 19 The Community
asserted that the provision should only be improved with respect to a
better practical application of Article XIX which application should be
backed by clearly defined conditions.320
This interpretation, however, was not acceptable to other contracting
parties. Japan and the newly industrializing countries feared that a safe-
guard clause permitting selective actions would only be applied against
their competitive low-cost products.32 1 That was their experience under
the Textile Arrangements and the various bilateral restraint agreements
and they wanted to avoid it in the future.32 2
Finally, the politically less influential developing countries agreed to
selectivity as a further working hypothesis. 2 However, aware of the sig-
nificance of this concession, they demanded as a basic precondition that
all selective safeguard action be taken only in agreement with the affected
exporting country or, in the absence of such an agreement, only with
prior approval of the GATT Committee on Safeguards. 2" Furthermore,
the Committee should provide the criteria and conditions for a selective
action with an ex post facto review immediately thereafter. The develop-
ing countries believed that under critical circumstances, delay would
cause irreparable damage. Actually this provision proved to be the major
sticking point of the Article XIX negotiations.
The EEC, however, went one step further and threatened to apply
selective safeguard measures even in the absence of a safeguard code. 25
The extent to which the reservations of the developing countries on selec-
tive safeguard measures were justified was revealed by the discriminatory
safeguard action taken by the EEC against television sets from South Ko-
rea in 1977. The EEC notified GATT that the restriction had been im-
posed for the British market because of a clear threat of serious injury to
British producers. 2 The majority of GATT members considered the ac-
319 See D. ROBERTSON, supra note 30, at 47-48 (discussing the development of the Euro-
pean Community's position on Article XIX reform); see also S. GOLT, THE GATT NEGOTIA-
TIONS, 1973-75: A. GUIDE TO THE ISSUES 59, Appendix B (reprinting the key document stat-
ing the European Community position- Development of an Overall Approach to Trade in
View of the Coming Multilateral Negotiations in GATT).
310 See D. ROBERTSON, supra note 30, at 48.
321 See R. KEMPER, supra note 317, at 21.
322 See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
323 See R. KEMPER, supra note 317, at 22.
324 See id. at 22.
325 Curzon Price, supra note 317, at 311; see generally 10. LONG, supra note 2, at 91,
94.
320 GATT, AcTivrris IN 1978 85.
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tion to be in violation of Article XIX and were especially concerned that
the measure had been directed against a developing country.327 In addi-
tion, Korea felt that the EEC had merely speculated upon the probable
situation of market disruption on an assumption that Korean producers
were planning to increase their exports to the United Kingdom. 28 The
dispute was settled by Korea's agreement to accept voluntary export
restraints. 329
2. The arguments on the discrimination issue
After a safeguard code permitting discriminatory safeguard action
had been agreed upon by the major negotiating countries as a working
hypothesis, the dispute primarily concentrated on the conditions of such
action. The various arguments behind the selectivity issue were critical,
however, since it was by far the most controversial negotiation topic in
Article XIX and affected the core of GATT itself-the MFN principle
and reciprocity.
A major argument for non-discriminatory safeguard actions was
based upon the notion that the MFN principle, in connection with Article
XIX, constitutes a protective device for the smaller and weaker coun-
tries.33 0 Because of its significance as a principle of "fairness" in interna-
tional trade, the MFN principle should ensure "equal" treatment among
sovereign countries of different economic strengths.33' Technically, the
"equal protection" of the weaker developing countries is assured by the
remedies provided for in Article XIX. If a country imposes trade restric-
tions, it has to offer compensation or face retaliatory measures from the
affected countries.33
2
Suppose that the safeguard measure is imposed in a discriminatory
way on imports from a single country. Since the MFN principle would not
apply under Article XIX, compensation offers would be due, according to
the principle of reciprocity, only to this particular country. Also, retalia-
tory measures could only be expected from this particular country.333
Compensatory offers are most likely to occur, however, only if the af-
327 Id. at 86.
328 Id. at 85-86. Korean authorities denied the existence of any such plan. Id. at 85.
329 GATT, AcTivrriEs IN 1979 70. It is interesting to note that under the "selective"
safeguard approach advocated by the European Community, voluntary export restraints of
the kind Korea agreed to would be unnecessary.
330 Bratschi, GATT: Targets for Reform, 7 J. WORLD TRADE L. 393, 395 (1973); Curzon
Price, supra note 317, at 312; MacBean, How to Repair the 'Safety Net' of the Interna-
tional Trading System, 2 WORLD ECON. 149. (1978); Tumlir, supra note 81, at 409.
221 Tumlir, supra note 81, at 409; D. ROBERTSON, supra note 30, at 68.
322 See Tumlir, supra note 81, at 408-09 nn. 6 & 7.
123 See Tumlir, supra note 81, at 407; D. ROBERTSON, surpa note 30, at 27.
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fected country has an effective retaliatory capacity at its disposal in order
to press for adequate compensation."8 4 Satisfactory compensation for re-
stricted exports depends, therefore, on the economic strength of the af-
fected country. Only those countries which are sufficiently strong can re-
taliate effectively and confidently expect to be compensated. Developing
countries have reason to fear that a "solution" to a trade dispute with an
industrialized country would be imposed by the stronger importing coun-
try."5 As a result, their export interests would not be protected by a se-
lective safeguard code.
On the other hand, a safeguard measure which has to be applied erga
omnes according to the MFN principle affects all trading partners. The
content of such a non-discriminatory action is open to multilateral negoti-
ation during the consultation process.3 38 Since more interests are in-
volved, the combined retaliatory capacity of all countries would ensure
adequate compensation which, according to the MFN principle as well as
to the principle of reciprocity, must be granted to all countries
concerned. 3
7
Consequently, the weaker developing countries can also count on ad-
equate compensation or more lenient terms under the safeguard action.
They do not risk being subjected to the will of economically stronger
countries. Their weak bargaining power is equalized through the influence
of collectivity. Procedurally this is achieved by non-discriminatory safe-
guard actions which form a protective device for the developing countries.
Moreover, restrictions imposed on an MFN basis cause all affected
countries to have an interest in a speedy termination of the restriction.3-
In the case of discriminatory action, on the other hand, only one or a few
countries have an interest in the revocation of the restriction. Selective
safeguard actions tend, therefore, to establish permanent trade barriers.
The MFN principle, however, supports temporary relief which is essen-
tially the purpose of an escape clause.
Since selective safeguard actions are less costly to apply as well as to
maintain, a steady proliferation of discriminatory actions can be pre-
dicted. This trend is evident in bilateral restraint agreements. These
agreements have also shown that selective restrictions give third export-
ing countries the opportunity to increase their market shares by filling
the gap created by the restricted country.3 9 The importing country would
" Tunlir, supra note 81, at 409.
335 Id.
331 GATT, supra note 6, at art. XIX(2).
"I See Tumlir, supra note 81, at 409.
11 Id.; see also Murray & Walter, Quantitative Restrictions, Developing Countries,
and GATT, 11 J. WORLD TRADE L. 391, 420-21 (1979).
339 See, e.g., G. PATTERSON, supra note 127, at 299.
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be forced to impose safeguard measures on third country imports. Conse-
quently, trade barriers which after great efforts have been lowered at pre-
vious GATT rounds can be expected to proliferate easily. World trade
threatens to dissolve into bilateralism. 3 4 0
Selective safeguard measure would also tend to punish the most effi-
cient producer.3 41 Safeguard action is essentially different from anti-
dumping or other remedies against unfair trading practices in that the
injury to the domestic industry is caused by the efficiency of the foreign
industry.342 Although GATT's position is not that of a pure freetrader
because it favours the domestic over the foreign producer, through the
MFN clause it at least provides exporters with the opportunity to com-
pete on an equal footing. Penalizing only the most efficient producer con-
stitutes a retreat from this fundamental GATT position towards interna-
tional trade.34 3
The easier access to a safeguard provision permitting selective action
also has political consequences. First, developing countries which are pre-
vented from gaining a foothold in the industrialized markets are virtually
forced to question GATT's usefulness in providing a framework for eco-
nomic development. 34 4 Since most developing countries already regard
UNCTAD as the principal forum for economic development issues,
GATT's reputation as a rich man's club would be buttressed.34 5 Second,
the mere possibility of treating countries differently creates friction and
discontent and rather than .reaffirming the rule of law in providing clear
guidance on how to react to trade disputes, selective safeguard actions
represent a step backwards to pure power politics.A4
These arguments in favour of non-discriminatory safeguard actions
are based on a two-step assumption. The first step is that trade restric-
tion are generally regarded as undesirable. The second step is, that inside
a collectivity, where trade restrictions have an immediate and direct im-
pact on all other participants, the resort to trade restrictions will be mini-
mized or at least directed into avenues of orderly conduct. The technical
instrument which provided for this impact in GATT, however, is the
MFN principle in conjunction with Article XIX. This approach reasserts
the MFN principle and may be understood to reaffirm the rule of law in
340 See Curzon Price, supra note 317, at 312. But see Tumlir, supra note 81, at 409
(suggesting that in certain contexts waiver of the MFN principle will will not lead to "crass
bilateralism").
,41 D. ROBERTSON, supra note 30, at 66; MacBean, supra note 330, at 157.
311 MacBean, supra note 330, at 157.
313 Curzon Price, supra note 317, at 312.
31 See Fiallo, The Negotiation Strategy of Developing Countries in the Field of Trade
Liberalization, 11 J. WORLD TRADE L. 203, 204-07 (1977).
315 Id. at 206, 211.
316 Curzon Price, supra note 317, at 312-13.
1982
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
GATT.3 4 7
There are persuasive arguments in favour of a code on safeguards
permitting discriminatory actions. One of the reasons for the proliferation
of emergency actions in circumvention of Article XIX was the costly ap-
plication of Article XIX. An erga omnes imposition of safeguards necessi-
tates either high compensation offers or substantial retaliation measures.
Accordingly, the EEC, in pressing for selective safeguards, sought to
achieve a "cheaper" application procedure for market safeguards.3' 8 A
safeguard action can be regarded as "cheaper" when the importing coun-
try has to face compensation requests or retaliation threats only from the
country or countries responsible for the increased imports.349
If circumventions of Article XIX became unnecessary, then the amal-
gamation of the various bilateral restraint agreements could be phased
out. These bilateral restraint agreements amounted to selective "safe-
guard" measures. By providing countries with more discretionary powers,
a safeguard code permitting selective action would enhance the chances
for the greater degree of legal order in the safeguard system. Countries
would then be prepared, in exchange for more discretionary freedom in
the application of safeguards, to notify, consult, and justify any emer-
gency action under the body of GATT.
3 5 0
However, the Korea case shows that selective safeguard actions do
not necessarily suspend the usage of "voluntary" export restraints.39 1 Al-
though the safeguard action on television sets was imposed in a discrimi-
natory fashion only against exports from South Korea, the matter was
settled by the negotiation of a "voluntary" export restraint.35 2 Escape
from multilateral surveillance seemed to be the main reason for the con-
clusion of the bilateral restraint. Ironically, a selective safeguard action is
a more suitable non-discriminatory action than these "voluntary" re-
straints: a selective action is easier to implement and can be used as an
immediate threat for the negotiation of "voluntary" restraints.
Limiting the effect of an emergency action to the source of the immi-
nent or actual injury makes sense. Other countries should not suffer from
347 See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
348 Curzon Price, supra note 317, at 309.
341 Curzon Price, supra note 317, at 309; Curzon & Curzon, supra note 21, at 224;
Wyndham-White, Negotiations in Prospect in TOWARD A NEW WORLD TRADE POLICY: THE
MARDENHEAD PAPERS 335 (C. Bergsten ed. 1975).
110 R. BALDWIN, BEYOND THE TOKYO ROUND NEGOTIATIONS 16-17 (Trade Policy Research
Centre, Thames Essay No. 22, London, 1979); D. ROBERTSON, supra note 30, at 65; Curzon
Price, supra note 317, at 309; Solomon, Safeguard Mechanisms in TOWARD A NEW WORLD
TRADE POLICY: THE MARDENHEAD PAPERS 279-80 (C. Bergsten ed. 1975); Tumlir, supra note
81, at 412-17.
351 See supra notes 326-29 and accompanying text.
352 GATT, ACTIVITIES IN 1979, at 70.
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the irresponsible and excessive export performance of only one or a small
number of countries. If non-discriminatory measures are applied, tradi-
tional suppliers and new entrants to the import market are likely to be
harmed.35 3 Consequently, a selective safeguard mechanism would consti-
tute the true protective device for developing countries. In most cases the
newly industrialized countries and Japan are responsible for the market
dislocations. Under a non-discriminatory safeguard action, not only these
countries but also the least developed among the developing countries are
affected by the subsequent restrictions. 5 Their young economies, which
usually concentrate on only a few products, suffer more from trade re-
strictions than the more developed economies of the "graduates," who
can more easily diversify product lines in order to minimize the impact of
trade restrictions. Moreover, a major practical problem of determining
"just" quotas is created by the MFN requirement, which makes it virtu-
ally impossible to preserve this principle in its full integrity.355
The MFN postulate is essentially an instrument of tariff poicy.3 56
Article I provides that, with respect to tariffs, any advantages granted by
one contracting party to another shall be accorded immediately and un-
conditionally to all other contracting parties.3 57 In other words, tariff con-
cessions granted to one country must be applied to all countries. For
more than a decade, however, quantitative restrictions had a more
profound impact on trade than tariffs and are likely to do so in the fu-
ture.3 58 Ignoring, for a moment, the negative impact of the MFN treat-
ment in the case of raising trade barriers instead of lowering them, the
key requirement of a quota determination on MFN basis would read: the
quota allocated to one country should be allocated to all countries.
This postulate derives from Article XIII, which requires countries to
apply quotas on a non-discriminatory basis.3 59 In order to meet this re-
quirement, a global quota for the product would allow all suppliers to
compete as previously in the unrestricted prequota market. Seemingly the
proper solution.3 60
In a global quota assignment, however, the competition tends to be
tougher than in an unrestricted market. In a case where increased im-
ports originate in only one or a few countries, these dynamic producers
35B D. ROBERTSON, supra r ote 30, at 65; see also Curzon Price, supra note 317, at 309-
311; Curzon & Curzon, supra note 21, at 224; Solomon, supra note 350, at 280.
"I Meier, supra note 85, at 511; Meier, The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Nego-
tiations and the Developing Countries, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 239 253 (1980).
Tumlir, supra note 81, at 410.
I d.
S7 GATT, supra note 6, at art. I(1).
3" See generally Murray & Walter, supra note 338.
3" GATT, supra note 6, at art. XIII(1).
360 Id. at art. XIII(2)(a).
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would probably drive other long established suppliers out of the quota-a
result which is hardly in the spirit of general MFN treatment, which is
intended to ensure equal export opportunities.3 "
In order to protect the established suppliers, the restricting country
might subdivide the global product quota into different product varieties
as was done in the LTA 62 Again, once their major product line is re-
strained, the more dynamic producers can be expected to diversify and
fill the remaining quotas.363
The last possibility of a fair quota allocation lies in the establishment
of individual country quotas.3  The restraining country has two alterna-
tives. 6 5 First, it can assure all countries an equally limited growth based
upon their performance within a certain reference period.366 Second, each
country can be guaranteed an individual growth rate based upon its re-
cord in this reference period, but scaled down proportionately. For exam-
ple, previous unrestricted individual growth rates of twelve, six, and two
percent might be scaled down to restricted growth rates of six, three, and
one percent. This alternative exemplifies a quota determination on an
MFN basis. Both alternatives, however, have disadvantages in their theo-
retical nature.
Their implementation requires permanent surveillance of the relative
competitiveness of the various exporters in order to keep them in their
assigned quotas. Furthermore, full compliance with the MFN principle in
its strictest form is, even in the most narrowly defined industry, hard to
achieve, since not all countries produce exactly the same products. In
other words, an exact MFN based quota system is not operable. Selec-
tively imposed safeguards, on the other hand, would best meet the coun-
try's individual requirements. Therefore, discriminatory safeguard actions
appear to be the best solution.
Indeed, this argument for selective safeguards in the case of quotas
derives originally from Article XIII, which provides for the non-discrimi-
natory administration of quotas. The rigidity of this attempt was already
regarded as the formulation of GATT and is illustrated by the indefinite
wording of Article XIII, para. 2. The point is, quotas are "inhereintly dis-
criminatory.'3 67 The following dilemma was regarded as one of the rea-
361 Murray & Walter, supra note 338, at 394-95.
362 See Tumlir, supra note 81, at 410; see also supra note 149 and accompanying text.
The Long-term Arrangement substantially adopted the categories set out in Appendix B of
the Short-term Arrangement. Short-term Arrangement, supra note 132, at App. B.
363 See Tumlir, supra note 81, at 411.
GATT, supra note 6, at art. XIII(2)(d).
365 Id.
3 6 The Multi-Fibre Arrangement provides for an equally restricted growth of 6 per-
cent. Multi-Fibre Arrangement, supra note 161, at Annex B(2).
367 J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 322.
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sons that quotas were not brought into the general MEN obligation of
Article 1:368
[M]aintaining historical market shares in the allocation [quota] process
discriminates against new exporters while changing market shares is sub-
ject to discretionary decision-making. At the same time the decisions
taken will be influenced by the bargaining power of the importing coun-
try and the actual and potential exporters, respectively, generally favor-
ing larger countries over smaller ones.38 9
A final argument in favor of selective safeguards concerns the original
purpose of the MFN clause, to contribute to the lowering of tariff barri-
ers. Advantages and privileges granted by one country to another should
be accorded immediately to all countries concerned.3 7 0 In the case of a
non-discriminatory safeguard action, however, trade restrictions imposed
on one country's exports are immediately accorded to all other countries
which happen to be exporters of the product affected. Most-favoured-na-
tion treatment becomes most-disfavoured-nation treatment.
MFN is in fact a ready-made instrument for setting in motion a down-
ward spiral in the process of bargaining, once nations begin to adopt an
adversary posture towards one another.... Assuming that everyone in-
sists on precise reciprocity, there is no end to the series of consequent
adjustments that may have to be made.17 1
The arguments against non-discriminatory safeguards are not con-
cerned with the possible impact of the MFN principle upon the notion of
collectivity as a barrier to proliferation and abuse of safeguards. Instead,
the arguments are concerned with the actual impact of the MFN princi-
ple on the enforcement of safeguards. This also implies a two-step under-
standing of the issue. First, to a certain extent safeguard actions are gen-
erally regarded as necessary and desirable. Second, their implementation
must be simplified in order to create an effective and operable safeguard
system. This approach compromises the MFN principle. It may be char-
acterized as the "pragmatic" course to solving problems in GATT rather
than reaffirming "the rule of law" as advanced by the arguments on the
retention of the MFN principle.
3 7 2
365 J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 323-24.
-69 Balassa, supra note 2, at 423.
37o GATT, supra note 6, at art. L
171 Shonfield, International Economic Relations of the Western World. An Overall
View in 1 INTERNATIONAL EcONOmic RELATIONS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 1969-1971, at 47-48
(A. Shonfield ed. 1976) quoted in Meier, supra note 85, at 510-11.
372 Cf. supra note 347 and accompanying text.
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3. The outcome of the dispute
The principle of introducing discriminatory safeguards was agreed to
at the end of the Tokyo Round.3 73 The draft code provides that safe-
guards may be limited to imports from a particular country only under
unusual, exceptional, and unforeseen circumstances. These exist if:
a) a very sharp and substantial increase of imports over a short period of
time is taking place from not more than two or three sources,
b) these imports take a significant and rapidly increasing share of the
domestic consumption and they significantly displace the domestic pro-
duction rather than imports from other sources,
c) these imports individually account for a substantial proportion of total
imports, and
d) imports from other countries cannot be regarded as a significant factor
on the unusual and exceptional unforeseen circumstances.374
The question of ex ante or ex post facto approval of safeguard ac-
tions was downgraded in the draft code to a question of notification and
consultation. Thus, the draft code provides that "no such measures
should be taken without prior notification and consultation."37 5 Moreover,
the prior notification should be made as far in advance as may be "practi-
cable". 76 This standard is susceptible to broad interpretation. The prior
consultation requirement might be waived, if a delay could cause irrepa-
rable damage.377
The tentative outcome of the negotiations on selectivity reveals a
typical feature of the GATT practice involving dispute resolution. On one
hand, the GATT has been considered pragmatic and flexible and not
likely to dissolve in the face of legal technicalities.3 7 8 On the other hand,
the necessity for the "reaffirmation of the rule of law"37 and the legally
binding character of GATT rules have been emphasized. 80 In the case of
selective safeguards it appeared appropriate to take a pragmatic course
on the MFN principle. A strictly interpreted MFN principle was not en-
forceable. More importantly, the major trading bloc of the EEC and the
Scandinavian countries was not prepared to accept an MFN based
173 See supra notes 323-324 and accompanying text; see also 10. LONG, supra note 2,
at 14-15.
174 Draft Safeguard Code, supra note 278, at 10-11 (footnotes omitted).
371 Id. at 11 n.3.
376 Id. at 19.
377 Id.
378 J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 755.
7 Long, supra note 268, at 257.
380 K. DAM, supra note 11, at 3-4; R. HUDEC, supra note 11, at 268; J. JACKSON, supra
note 8, at 755; Hudec, supra note 192, at 157.
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solution. 3 1
The pragmatic course of compromising on the MFN principle should
foster the achievement of a legally binding multilateral approval and sur-
veillance of safeguard actions. Two of the basic functions of the MFN
principle in the context of Article XIX, the protective impact upon devel-
oping countries and the inherent control mechanism against the prolifera-
tion and the abuse of safeguards, are consistent with the principle of mul-
tilaterality. This principle, distinct from MFN, stands for "common
responsibilities, joint decisions and surveillance, a continuous presence of
a concerned forum in which a country can complain, and seek mediation
for its grievance against another country, or even seek adjudication. 3 8 2
Experience with the rarely invoked MFN safeguards revealed the ne-
cessity of making emergency actions subject to GATT surveillance. In the
case of safeguards, the principle of multilaterality proved to be more im-
portant than the MFN principle. The approach of "compromising with
the MFN principle without sacrificing multilaterality"3 83 enables the
elimination of actions taken outside of GATT and the subjection of all
safeguard actions to the commonly agreed upon GATT rules. For this
purpose, however, the Article XIX requirements, such as the injury deter-
mination and the surveillance procedures, need improvement.
C. Differential and More Favourable Treatment for Developing
Countries
The issue of differential and more favourable treatment for develop-
ing countries can be traced throughout the Tokyo Round negotiations.
Under GATT, the legal basis for differential and more favourable treat-
ment derives from the impact of the MFN treatment on countries at dif-
ferent stages of economic development. The GATT rules, especially the
MFN principle and reciprocity, which were enacted in a homogeneous in-
ternational economic community, proved to be inadequate to deal with
the growing diversity of the GATT membership.3
Equal treatment of unequals, as provided by the unconditional MFN
principle, promotes continuous inequality. This is cause for concern with
respect to efforts to combat underdevelopment through international
trade. Therefore, the MFN principle had to be converted into a "real"
equality principle, where unequals are treated unequally.38 5
861 See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
862 Tumlir, supra note 81, at 409-10.
u' Id. at 410.
Approximately two-thirds of the countries participating in the Tokyo Round negoti-
ations were developing countries. See 1 0. LONG, supra note 2, at Annex A.
"65 Yusuf, "Differential and More Favourable Treatment". The GATT Enabling
Clause, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L. 488, 492 (1980). See also Gros Espiell, supra note 21, at 37;
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In fact, the idea of differential treatment of the disadvantaged coun-
tries has been discussed under international law for the past two decades.
Several approaches to legal entitlement for differential treatment have
been postulated. They focus primarily on either a "Double Standard,"
which advocates different legal standards for different groups of states,s 6
analogously with the modern welfare state, within which the special needs
of the disadvantaged subjects "entitle" them to preferential treatment.a7
During the mid-1970's, the idea of preferential treatment for devel-
oping countries was included in virtually every important U.N. statement
on international economic relations.3 8 Although these resolutions and
declarations do not establish any legal obligations, they nevertheless raise
the expectation that states will abide by the principles of these resolu-
tions and declarations.8 " Even if one cannot speak of a legal entitlement
or obligation of preferential treatment, the idea of differential and more
favourable treatment has been generally accepted. In practice, preferen-
tial trade schemes for developing countries have been implemented by
the major industrialized countries since the early 1970's.3so This scheme is
Gros Espiell, GATT: Accommodating Generalized Preferences, 8 J. WORLD TRADE L. 341,
344 (1974); Meier, supra note 85, at 518; Schachter, The Evolving Internationl Law of De-
velopment, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 7, 9-11 (1976).
38 See G. MYRDAL, AN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 288, 291-92 (1956); G.
SCHWARZENBERGER, THE FRONTIERS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 29, 34 (1962) (differentiating be-
tween the international laws of reciprocity and coordination which indicates a search for a
double standard); Fatouros, International Law and the Third World, 50 VA. L. REv. 783,
811 (1964).
- Schachter, supra note 385, at 10. Professor Schacter refers to the "premises of the
modern welfare state" as the rationale for preferential treatment for specially disadvantaged
countries, such as land-locked states and former colonies, which have special needs that
entitle them to such treatment. See also B. ROLING, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AN EXPANDED
WORLD 83-86 (1960); W. FRIEDMAN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 68
(1964) (refering to the "growing number of fields in which nations cooperate for purposes of
international welfare").
. See, e.g., Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order,
G.A. Res. 3201, (S-VI), Sixth Special Session, U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 3 U.N. Doc. A/
9959 (1974); Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974); Resolution on Development and Inter-
national Economic Co-operation, G.A. Res. 3362, (S-VII), Seventh Special Session, U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 3, U.N. Doc. A/10301 (1976); Lima Declaration and Plan of Action on
Industrial Development and Co-operation, U.N. Doc. ID/B/155/add. 1 (1975), reprinted in
14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 826 (1975).
11 See Schacter, supra note 385, at 3-7; Garibaldi, The Legal Status of General As-
sembly Resolutions: Some Conceptual Observations, 1979 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 324,
328-332 (remarks of Professor McDougal); Schwebel, The Effect of Resolutions of the U.N.
General Assembly on Customary International Law, 1979 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 301.
3" See Yusuf, supra note 385, at 493 n. 27. For a discussion of the EEC, Australian,
and Japanese schemes, see Behnam, Development and Structure of the Generalized Sys-
tem of Preference, 9 J. WORLD TRADE L. 442, 447-56 (1975).
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frequently referred to as the Generalized System of Preference (GSP).
Initiated by the UNCTAD, this system can be summarily described as
one of "non-reciprocal general tariff reductions on the manufactured and
semi-manufactured imports from developing countries. '91
1. Differential and more favourable treatment in GATT
Prior to the Tokyo Round, attempts to include preferential provi-
sions for the benefit of developing countries occurred when Part IV on
Trade and Development was negotiated in 1964.392 Concrete results, how-
ever, could not be reached. Along with their soft language, the Part VI
provisions were voluntary rather than mandatory. Later in 1971, the Gen-
eral System of Preferences was brought to GATT. In order to grant trade
preference to developing countries, the authorization of GATT members
to disregard the general MFN requirement took the form of waivers in-
stead of being directly implemented into the GATT framework.393 How-
ever, with the Tokyo Round results, differential and more favourable
treatment became an integral part of the GATT legal system and waivers
were no longer required.3 9
4
In addition to the Generalized System of Preferences, differential
and more favourable treatment refers to the non-tariff measures negoti-
ated during the Tokyo Round.39 5 Consequently, the issue of differential
and more favourable treatment also includes negotiations on a safeguard
code.
2. Differential and more favourable treatment under Article XIX
a. The Economic Background
Before discussing the actual issues under Article XIX the economic
implications of safeguard restrictions imposed on the exports of develop-
ing countries must be explored.
First, the notion has to be abandoned that a developing country
which exports to an industrialized country is at fault when these exports
cause dislocation in the market of the developed country. On the con-
trary, a country should reasonably expect to improve its economic per-
formance through exports at a comparative advantage.39 6
This view is especially relevant for developing countries in the early
'91 Behnam, supra note 390, at 244.
:92 GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 13th Supp. 2 (1965).
13 See GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 18th Supp. 24 (1972); GATT, BISD, supra note 6,
18th Supp. 26 (1972).
3,4 GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 26th Supp. 203 (1980).
:95 See 1 0. LONG, supra note 2, at 96-99.
8 Meier, supra note 85, at 519.
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stages of industrialization which pursue their international trade at an
infant industry level. Other GATT provisions already relate to the prefer-
ential treatment of developing countries with respect to infant trade.3 9 7 In
terms of export market disruption, the damage caused by safeguard re-
strictions to countries like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore
might well be reduced by quotas guaranteed by the MFA, which permit a
growth factor of six percent. However, during the early stages of develop-
ment, infant industries depend on growth factors that far exceed the level
of the MFA. 98 Differential and more favourable treatment of these coun-
tries is inevitable if severe damage to their economic development is to be
avoided.
In practice, safeguard restrictions burden developing countries more
than industrialized countries. First, the export earnings of developing
countries are often concentrated in a few product groups. 99 For some de-
veloping countries, the economic hardship which is caused by quantita-
tive restrictions on their exports, may often exceed the advantage gained
by an industrialized country in protecting its ailing industry. 00 Second, in
industrialized nations the sudden imposition of quantitative restrictions
releases productive factors which are usually unemployed for only a short
period before they are absorbed by other sectors of the economy.4 01 The
situation in developing countries is not nearly as flexible. Their economic
structure is not sufficiently pliant to afford the necessary alternatives.
Their resources are much more bound to one industry and less transfera-
ble than those in developed countries.0 2 Therefore, underutilized produc-
tive factors cause an immediate decrease in productivity. Additional
losses have to be expected from consequential costs, such as welfare ex-
penditures to the unemployed. 408
b. The Issues
The developing countries proposed that as a general rule they should
be excluded from safeguard restrictions imposed by developed coun-
tries.40 4 An alternative way of accomplishing more favourable treatment
397 GATT, supra note 6, at arts. XVIII(2), (3), (13) & XXXVI.
308 Murray & Walter, supra note 338, at 404; Frank, The "Graduation" Issue for LDCs,
13 J. WORLD TRADE L. 289, 292 (1979).
3" Murray & Walter, supra note 338, at 403.
400 Id.
401 Id.
411 Meier, supra note 85, at 519.
403 Murray & Walter, supra note 338, at 403. The mere threat of protectionist restric-
tions by the importing country may cause a welfare loss in the exporting country. See
Bhagwati, supra note 89, at 1007.
44 1 0. LONG, supra note 2, at 93.
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lies in mandatory compensation payments made to a less developed ex-
porting country in order to offset damages to its export trade. Mandatory
compensation is suggested because developing countries do not possess
the retaliatory power to press for appropriate compensation under Article
XIX.405
The developing countries' proposal to be exempted from safeguard
restrictions imposed by developed countries would result in a partial re-
moval of the unconditional MFN treatment under Article XIX.4 06 As
might be recalled from the discussion on selectivity, the developed coun-
tries favoured the elimination of the MFN principle with regard to safe-
guard actions, whereas the developing countries were in favour of its re-
tention.40 7 In advocating non-discriminating safeguards, the developing
countries would not be handicapped. Now the issue was to gain preferen-
tial treatment. The developing countries demanded that the discrimina-
tion against their exports should be converted into discrimination in fa-
vour of their expoits.
40'
In fact, before the Tokyo Round negotiations actually started, the
suggestion that developing countries be exempted from safeguard actions
by developed countries was subject to discussions in the GATT Commit-
tee on Trade and Development. The exemption demand was based upon
Part IV of GATT, particularly Article XXXVII.409 The developed coun-
tries did not consider this recommendatory provision as being designed to
weaken their access to Article XIX. However, they were prepared to con-
sider the interests of developing countries and to refrain from emergency
actions in particular cases.4
10
From the outset of this proposal, a complete exemption from safe-
guard measures, especially with respect to the growing importance of sev-
eral developing countries as main suppliers of certain manufactures, was
from the outset of this proposal very unlikely and accordingly rejected by
the developed countries during the Tokyo Round. 411 Subsequent discus-
405 R. KEMPER, supra note 317, at 21; Meier, supra note 85, at 520; Bhagwati, supra
note 89, 1007-09.
406 It has to be recalled that the MFN principle has not been maintained in its strict
unconditional sense. The GSP, as well as the exceptions for customs unions under GATT
Article XXIV, may be taken as examples. With respect to Article XIX, however, the MFN
principle was still in its unconditional form prior to the Tokyo Round. See KrAmer, Chang-
ing Principles Governing International Trade, 8 J. WORLD TRADE L. 227, 228-35 (1974).
407 See supra notes 317-321 and accompanying text.
405 UNCTAD, Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Evaluation and Further Recommenda-
tions Arising Therefrom 25, U.N. Doc. TD/227 (1979).
401 GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 18th Supp. 68 (1972); GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 19th
Supp. 30 (1973).
4,0 GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 18th Supp. 68 (1972); GATT, BISD, supra note 6, 19th
Supp. 30 (1973).
411 Tumlir, supra note 81, at 411.
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sions on the exemption issue focussed on the so-called graduation clause.
The developed countries favoured an approach which divided devel-
oping countries into different classes of entitlement according to their
level of development.412 Such a compromise on the MFN principle was
reasonable since the least developed and negligibly competitive countries
need not be penalized. Differential and more favourable treatment could
be withheld from the developing countries which have become interna-
tionally competitive in the trade of the product in question. On the other
hand, the least developed countries could be exempted from safeguard
measures by developed countries.41
This type of "graduation clause" originated in the context of the ena-
bling clause, in which the developing countries agreed that "with the pro-
gressive development of their economies and improvement in their trade
situation they would accordingly expect to participate more fully in the
framework of rights and obligations under the General Agreement." 414
The clause was heavily criticized by the developing countries. They
maintained that there was no uniform basis for such categorization and
that the concept would permit developed countries to discriminate among
developing countries in an arbitrary and unilateral manner.4 5 However,
the underlying necessity of this clause cannot be denied. A two-tier ap-
proach in regard to differential treatment of developed and developing
countries416 is not immutable. Experience proves that countries actually
"graduate" to higher levels of economic development. 1 7 Along with this
graduation process the economic conditions of developing countries im-
prove and the justification for preferential treatment decreases. Accord-
ingly, the exemption from safeguard measures is a variable issue.418 An
agreement on this topic has not been reached and the subsequent discus-
sions concentrated on the selectivity issue.419
In the context of Article XIX, no agreement could be reached con-
cerning the topic of differential and more favourable treatment for devel-
oping countries.420
412 See Meier, supra note 354, at 251-52.
413 For commentary on "graduation" clauses see Balassa, supra note 1, at 433; Balassa,
The Tokyo Round and the Developing Countries, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L. 93, 117 (1980);
Frank, supra note 398, at 296-97 (discussing the established "graduation" concept of the
World Bank and the IMF); Meier, supra note 354, at 254; Murray & Walter, supra note 338,
at 416; Tumlir, supra note 81, at 411.
414 See GATT, BISD, supra note 6, at 203 (1980).
418 See, e.g., UNCTAD, Arusha Programme for Collective Self-Reliance and Framework
for Negotiations 35, U.N. Doc. TD/236 (1979).
416 See supra notes 385-387 and accompanying text.
417 Balassa, supra note 413, at 115.
418 Id.
418 See 1 0. LONG, supra note 2, at 93; Draft Safeguard Code, supra note 278, at 31.
420 Draft Safeguard Code, supra note 278, at 31.
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Mandatory compensation, the second alternative for differential and
more favourable treatment, affects the principle of reciprocity. According
to the Article XIX mechanism, a country imposing safeguard restrictions
usually offers compensation to offset the detrimental effect on the export-
ing country. These compensations are negotiated in the consultations re-
quired by Article XIX.42 1 They are largely agreed upon by the invoking
country in order to avoid retaliatory measures imposed by the affected
countries.422 Developing countries, however, do not possess the retaliatory
capacity to press for equitable compensation. Consequently, in the view
of developing countries, the principle of reciprocity under Article XIX is
tied to economic strength and enables developed countries to take arbi-
trary actions.
To offset their weaker bargaining position, developing countries
claimed financial compensation as a matter of right instead of threat.423
The claim differs from the actual Article XIX practice where compensa-
tion usually takes the form of a tariff concession.424 However, with regard
to the above mentioned impact of safeguards on the weak economies of
some developing countries,'25 obviously tariff concessions in another field
will not cure the immediate damage to the particular exporting industry.
The question of financial compensation was not a concept entirely
new to GATT.42 ? As early as 1961 various developing countries proposed
that compensations be made by developed countries for their violations of
the GATT. An ad hoc Committee on Legal Amendments, however, re-
ferred to the practical difficulties in evaluating the actual loss incurred by
a country in its export opportunities in money terms.427 Moreover, the
enforcement payments would remain a problem and, in addition, it would
be inconceivable that national legislatures would vote for the budgetary
provisions for these purposes. 428 The arguments have not changed in the
present stage of international trade organization. Nations remain unwill-
ing to submit the issue to an international tribunal for the determination
of mandatory compensation payments.
On the contrary, one of the reasons governments circumvented Arti-
cle XIX was because of its link to reciprocity. Governments taking such
action under Article XIX had a hard time explaining to their constituants
that they had to compensate for emergency actions which appeared to be
421 See GATT, supra note 6, at art. XIX(2).
422 GATT, supra note 6, at art. XIX(3)(a).
423 See R. KEMPER, supra note 317, at 21.
'2' But see Bhagwati, supra note 89, at 1008-09, 1013-14 (discussing the U.S. payments
to Turkey as compensation for losses due to the ban on poppy production).
421 See supra notes 396-403 and accompanying text.
426 See Meier, supra note 85, at 520.
427 See id. at 520-21.
426 Meier, supra note 85, at 520-21.
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nothing more than rightful actions.42 9 Consequently, during the Tokyo
Round, negotiations concentrated on a partial removal of the principle of
reciprocity from Article XIX. The preliminary draft of a safeguard code
provided that the affected exporting country should "normally refrain
from exercising its rights under Article XIX: 3(a)", if the requirements of
a rightful safeguard section had been met.43 0 Thus, the demands made by
the developing countries for mandatory financial compensation have not
been accepted.
D. Adjustment Assistance to Safeguarded Industries
In general, there are three methods by which import competition
may ease disruptive of its domestic industry. First, it can install trade
barriers to keep the imports out.43 1 Second, it can grant adjustment assis-
tance to its non-competitive industry in an effort to diversify or reestab-
lish it in other fields of the economy.4 2 Third, a country can combine
both of these methods and impose safeguards which would provide a
gradual phasing out of its non-competitive industries and their gradual
redevelopment in other fields. 4 33
The issue of adjustment assistance has been stressed by developing
countries for several years. They argued that an intensified restructuring
of industrial production in developed countries is simply a necessary re-
sponse to growing industrialization in developing countries.4 4 This inter-
dependent viewpoint is especially relevant in the production of products
for which the long-term comparative advantage lies in favour of the de-
veloping countries. Domestic adjustment measures of developed countries
would contribute to the development process of the developing countries,
and would result in more efficient utilization of economic resources both
nationally and internationally. 43 5
Indeed, the need for structural adjustment can be regarded as widely
understood by various countries regardless of their stage of economic de-
velopment. The two major reports of the western industrialized countries
for the Tokyo Round, the "Rey Report" and the "Williams Report," both
stressed the need for structural adjustment as the "prime objective" of
safeguard actions. 43 6 However, in spite of this consensus, governments of
429 See MacBean, supra note 330, at 155-56; Tumlir, supra note 81, at 408.
430 Draft Safeguard Code, supra note 278, at 29.
431 See generally J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 567-68.
432 Id. at 568-70.
433 This is precisely how Article XIX has operated. See id. at 570.
43, See UNCTAD, Adjustment Assistance Measures 3-5 U.N. Doc. TD/B/c.2/198/Rev.1
(1978).
435 Id.
136 OECD, HIGH LEVEL GROUP ON TRADE AND RELATED PROBLEMS, POLICY PERSPECTIVES
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developed countries proved to be reluctant in providing the necessary ad-
justment assistance and resorted instead to permanent trade barriers.
These protectionist activities were, in fact, facilitated by Article XIX,
which did not impose any time limits on safeguard measures.43 7 One of
the reasons for imposing import restrictions instead of adjustment assis-
tance lies in the direct monetary costs the latter imposes on the taxpayer.
Import restrictions may actually raise fiscal revenues if applied as tariff
increases. Adjustment assistance costs are immediately visible and there-
fore may threaten the short-term political survival of the legislators im-
plementing them.438 Import restrictions also prevent temporary unem-
ployment in the affected import industry and are consequently favoured
by influential labour groups and trade unions.4 s s However, governments
of free market economies appear strictly opposed to massive governmen-
tal interventions which subsidize industries directly or indirectly.440 Such
programs would only create similar demands from non-subsidized indus-
tries thereby jeopardizing the whole free market system. Mandatory ad-
justment assistance measures would almost certainly be considered by
these governments as threats to their sovereignty.441 The shortsightedness
of such policies is obvious. Only steady adjustment ensures growth and
development. Although the costs of meeting the adjustment necessities
may appear high, the costs of not doing so could be much higher. 442
Moreover, charges by the developing countries are particularly dis-
ruptive has not been empirically verified.443 With respect to the "job dis-
placement argument,"--politically appealing, but lacking empirical sup-
port-evidence showed that imports from developing countries have had
only a very small effect on employment changes in developed countries. 444
It has been estimated that from 1970 to 1975 the job penetration in the
FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ECONoMIc RELATIONS 81-84 (1972) [also referred to as the
Rey Report]; WILLIAMS REPORT, supra note 149, at 47, 49.
437 See supra note 260-263 and accompanying text.
418 See WILLIAMS REPORT, supra note 149, at 48; UNCTAD, Adjustment Assistance
Measures, supra note 434, at 4; Curzon Price, supra note 317, at 314.
139 See UNCTAD, Adjustment Assistance Measures, supra note 434, at 4-5; see also S.
GOLT, supra note 319, at x-xii (comments of labor officials D.R. Montgomery, J. Morris, and
J. Sheinkman). For a discussion of the goals and biases of policymakers in the trade barrier
context, see C. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL EcONOMICS ch. 12 (1978).
440 See D. ROBERTSON, supra note 30, at 57.
441 UNCTAD, Adjustment Assistance Measures, supra note 434, at 6; D. ROBERTSON,
supra note 30, at 57; Rastello, The Tokyo Round: Trade Issues at Stake, 2 EUROPEAN NEWS
AGENCY 358 (1975).
442 See Curzon Price, supra note 317, at 313-314; Long, supra note 268, at 255-56.
43 See R. BLACKHURST, N. MARIAN, & J. TUMLIR, ADJUSTMENT, TRADE AND GROWTH IN
DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 63-66 (GATT Studies in International Trade No. 6
1978); D. ROBERTSON, supra note 30, at 56-59.
44, See D. ROBERTSON, supra note 30, at 57 n. 80.
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U.K. footwear industry amounted only to four tenths percent of the in-
dustry's labour force and to one and seven tenths percent in the clothing
industry.4"5 Instead, the decreased production in sensitive sectors, such as
textiles, electronics, and footwear, was caused by a deteriorated export
performance.44 In addition, technological progress played a dominant
role as a job displacement factor in some labour-intensive industries.4 7
Similar observations were made in other developed countries. 448
During the Tokyo Round negotations the developing countries de-
manded that safeguards under Article XIX be tied to domestic adjust-
ment assistance measures for the protected industry.449 For various rea-
sons, most of which have been outlined above, the developed countries
rejected this proposal.450 The draft code only provided that "appropriate
policy measures shall be taken to encourage the adjustment of domestic
producers to import competition.' 4 1 How far away a potential safeguard
code is from mandatory adjustment assistance can be implied from a re-
cent statement of the GATT Director-General:
The "problem of adjustment" tends to be viewed almost exclusively as
one of physical, industrial structures. Yet it cannot be solved if the
financial structures are not sound, flexibile and resilient-and we all
know that these structures are under considerable strain at present.
4 52
Another reformative proposal relates to the indefinite wording of Ar-
ticle XIX which permits safeguard restrictions "to the extent and for
such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury. "453
Stricter conditions should prevent safeguards from becoming permanent
trade restrictions by encouraging the necessary adjustment without man-
dating it.
Pending a final agreement, the draft code revealed the feasibility of
stricter conditions. Initially, safeguard measures should not exceed 18
months, but subject to extension, could total up to five years.'5 More-
over, no safeguard measure should be imposed on any product which was
subject to a safeguard measure within the preceding two years. 455 Where
feasible, safeguard measures should be progressively liberalized and
415 See Balassa, supra note 1, at 427.
446 Id.
447 Id.
448 See, e.g., D. ROBERTSON, supra note 30, at 57-58.
449 1 0: LONG, supra note 2, at 95.
450 UNCTAD, Multilateral Trade Negotiations, supra note 408, at 26.
451 Draft Safeguard Code, supra note 278, at 9 (emphasis added).
452 GATT Press Release, GATT/1288, at 7 (1981).
453 GATT, supra note 6, at art. XIX(1)(a).
411 Draft Safeguard Code, supra note 278, at 8.
455 Id.
Vol. 14:83
ARTICLE XIX
should not reduce the level of imports below the stage of the latest 12-
month period. 56 Similar to the MFA, the over-categorization of products
should be avoided.'5 7
E. Surveillance and Dispute Settlement
The foregoing discussion of an Article XIX reform reveals the neces-
sity of improved surveillance and dispute settlement techniques. Assum-
ing that agreement can be reached on the selectivity issue, an interna-
tional body for the approval or review of safeguard actions is necessary.
Moreover, if differential and more favourable treatment were granted on
the basis of a graduation clause, an international body would have to de-
termine a country's proper treatment in contested cases. In order to en-
sure a fair and comprehensive interpretation of data regarding the deter-
mination of a serious injury, an international body is necessary. Should
Article XIX reform in fact render the practice of bilateral restraints un-
necessary, the existing VERs and OMAs could be phased out under the
surveillance of the international body as provided for under the MFA.45 8
Under the draft code, a Committee on Safeguard Measures composed of
representatives from each of the contracting parties should principally
perform the necessary surveillance and dispute settlement tasks.45
When a country announces its intent to impose selective safeguard
measures, the draft code provides for consultations between the affected
countries as a first step.60 If an agreement cannot be reached within 60
days, the matter may be referred to the Committee which determines
whether the intended measure is "consistent with the obligations, condi-
tions, criteria and procedures established under [the code]." 461 In spe-
cially defined critical circumstances the procedures may be shortened. In
these situations, "where even a short delay would cause damage difficult
to repair," the importing country may seek urgent consultations, striving
to reach an interim agreement.4'6 If the consultations do not result in
such an agreement within 10 days, the importing country may take provi-
sional action subject to the prompt review of the Committee.483 Unless
the Committee determines that the measure is unjustified, the importing
country may proceed to apply the selective safeguard restriction.'6 Safe-
458 Id. at 9.
457 Compare id. with Multi-Fibre Arrangement, supra note 161, at art. 5.
418 Multi-Fibre Arrangement, supra note 161, at art. 2(10).
45, Draft Safeguard Code, supra note 278, at 22.
460 Id. at 12.
461 Id. at 12-13.
462 Id. at 13-14.
463 Id. at 14.
4" Id. at 15.
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guard measures on a MFN basis are to be approved and reviewed by the
Committee in a similar manner.465 All enforceable safeguard measures are
subject to the Committee's annual review."66
In the field of dispute settlement the Committee is responsible for
the investigation of and appropriate recommendations in regard to com-
plaints initiated by a contracting party who considers its rights under the
Agreement nullified or impaired by the safeguard action of another
party.467 Should the matter remain unresolved, the code calls for the
traditional means of dispute settlement under GATT, the establishment
of panels. 468 A panel is established only for a specific issue and only for a
limited period of time. It is to deliver its findings 60 days after its estab-
lishment.46 9 The panel's three to five members are selected from a list of
qualified governmental and non-official persons and serve in their indi-
vidual capacities and not as government representatives. 4 °7
The panel is entitled to seek information and technical advice from
any individual or body which it deems appropriate provided it informs
the government of the state having jurisdiction over that individual or
body.47 1 Each country is to respond promptly and fully to any request for
information by the panel.47 12 Confidential information may not be revealed
by the panel without the authorization of the country providing it.47 s
The panel reports its findings to the Committee in cases where a set-
tlement of the dispute cannot be reached.47 4 The Committee considers
the report and makes appropriate recommendations to the countries con-
cerned.47 5 In cases where these recommendations are not being followed,
the Committee may, if it considers the circumstances serious enough, au-
thorize the suspension of rights or obligations under the code.476 Also, it
may recommend that the "CONTRACTING PARTIES" authorize the
suspension of rights or obligations under the General Agreement pursu-
ant to Article XXIII, para. 2.47
These traditional procedures for the settlement of disputes have been
'6' Id. at 19.
466 Id. at 23.
467 Id.
,8 Id. at 24. For a detailed analysis of the GATT panel procedure, see R. HUDEC, supra
note 11, at 66-182.
46' Draft Safeguard Code, supra note 278, at 24.
470 Id. at 25.
471 Id. at 22.
472 Id. at 26. The term "promptly" has been defined as "within thirty days, or sooner if
possible". Id. at 22 n. 1.
173 Id. at 26.
474 Id. at 26-27.
175 Id. at 27.
476 Id.
177 Id. at 17.
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subject to increasing criticism in recent years. While in the early years of
GATT the establishment of ad hoc panels proved to be a successful tech-
nique, over the years it became more difficult to obtain the services of
adequately qualified and independent panelists.478 Usually these persons
serve simultaneously as representatives of their governments to GATT.
The impartiality of the panel members is not necessarily guaranteed by
the exclusion of nationals of the concerned parties from the panel proce-
dure. As long as the panelists are only temporarily released from their
duties as governmental officials, it is unlikely that they will function inde-
pendently from the overall foreign policy considerations of their
governments.47
9
The more important objection against the panel procedure, however,
is concerned with its leverage in influencing country's compliance with
the legal rules. The panels may play the role of conciliators between the
parties at dispute.4 0 Consequently, they urge the parties to reach an
agreement on the issue instead of determining whether and to what ex-
tent previously accepted rules apply to the situation. The conciliatory
technique favours a settlement of the dispute on the basis of the political
and economic strength of the parties reaching an agreement .41 The arbi-
tration or judicial method, on the other hand, begins by determining
whether a certain legal rule favours one party over the other.4 82 Since the
panel members are not free from the influence of their governments, they
are likely to prefer the conciliatory approach. To be sure, even strict arbi-
tration panels have to be sensitive to political and economic power rela-
tions. The point, however, is that the panels should not be too sub-
servient to powerful nations.483
Especially in the case of the GATT which works on the provisional
and rather narrow basis of political consensus unlike other international
478 Jackson, Governmental Disputes in International Trade Relations: A Proposal in
the Context of GATT, 13 J. WORLD TRADE L. 1,6 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Jackson, Gov-
ernmental Disputes].
479 Id.; Jackson, Birth of the GATT-MTN System: A Constitutional Approach, 12 L. &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 21,42 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Jackson, Birth of the GATT-MTN]; R.
BALDWIN, supra note 350, at 4-5, 19.
'" Jackson, Birth of the GATT-MTN, supra note 479, at 42.
4" See Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System, 12 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 93, 98-101 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions].
Jackson has developed an analysis which distinguishes between "power oriented" and "rule
oriented" diplomacy. His analytical framework pervades the following discussion of the
GATT dispute settlement mechanics.
482 Id.; See also Jackson, Governmental Disputes, supra note 478, at 3-4; Jackson,
Birth of the GATT-MTN, supra note 479, at 27-28.
4"' Perlow, supra note 162, at 106 n. 60 (arguing that a panel which combines substan-
tive legal and political consensus is more effective than a purely adjudicative body).
1982
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
organizations, the regulatory structure has never been very coercive.""
Consequently, GATT panels have avoided assuming adjudicatory roles
and have not stressed the obligatory character of the GATT rules.4 85 This
attitude corresponds generally with the dispute settlement procedures
under GATT. The fact that decisions are usually made by the "Con-
tracting Parties" (or the Committee which consists of representatives of
the entire GATT membership) gives the dispute settlement process nec-
essarily more political than judicial character.
As an alternative to the ad hoc establishment of panels, it was sug-
gested that a permanent body of experts in addition to the Committee on
Safeguards be established for continuing surveillance as well as dispute
settlement purposes.
480
The need for some kind of permanent international review and sur-
veillance commission with respect to Article XIX actions has been re-
ferred to for some time,8 7 and the similarity of such a proposed perma-
nent body to the Textiles Surveillance Body of the MFA has been
emphasized. 48 8 To the extent that the members of a permanent body such
as the TSB are recruited for a longer period than members of an ad hoc
panel, their impartiality might in fact be better guaranteed than under
the panel system. However, it remains unlikely that governments would
abide by the findings of an independent international body. The dispute
between the EEC and the TSB concerning the latter's competence is il-
lustrative of this attitude.489 The main advantage of an institution like
the TSB, however, is its permanent character with regard to its surveil-
lance function. A permanent surveillance body, which is small enough to
deal effectively with the necessary matters, unlike the slow machinery of
a committee composed of representatives of all member countries, applies
continuous pressure on governments to comply with the rules.490 A per-
manent surveillance body may prevent the non-compliance of govern-
ments with the rules in question a priori, whereas an ad hoc panel is only
effective ex post facto; after a member does not comply with the rules. A
permanent body in a small, efficient, and independent form appears most
useful for a safeguard system where so much depends on effective surveil-
lance. Accordingly, the TSB concept, which prevents conflicts through its
effective usage of informal enforcement pressure, seemed prima facie suit-
" Hudec, supra note 192, at 150.
485 Id.
411 1 0. LONG, supra note 2, at 94.
411 See D. ROBERTSON, supra note 30, at 62-64; Meier, supra note 85, at 509; Tumlir,
supra note 81, at 412.
488 See Hudec, supra note 192, at 168; MacBean, supra note 330, at 158.
411 See supra notes 202-206 and accompanying text.
4"' Hudec, supra note 192, at 168-69.
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able for a safeguard code.4 91 However, the remarkable success of the TSB
did not provide a precendent for wider use because governments seem
reluctant to bequeath national responsibilities to the authority of an in-
dependent international body.
IV. CONCLUSION
It can be concluded from the preceding discussion that the following
major points might be favorably implemented into a supplementary code
linked to the safeguard provision of Article XIX:
1) A more detailed determination of the "serious injury" criteria,
similar to the MFA definition but stripped of the price criterion,
can be expected.
2) Safeguards will most likely be permitted to apply in a discrimi-
natory manner under certain conditions. In order to avoid possi-
ble abuse a strong system of multilateral surveillance will be in-
troduced. Briefly, the MFN principle will be compromised and
the principle of multilaterality will be strengthened.
3) The code will probably include differential and more favour-
able treatment for developing countries according to the gradua-
tion clause. This implies compromises on the MEN principle as
well as on the principle of reciprocity.
4) Mandatory adjustment assistance measures are not likely to be
adopted. Stricter conditions, however, on the duration and liber-
alization of safeguard restrictions are feasible, which in turn will
make adjustment assistance inevitable.
5) An enhanced surveillance and dispute settlement procedure
under Article XIX is far from being established. The failure to
agree upon a standing independent surveillance body will render
the practical enforcement of the results of the foregoing issues
most uncertain.
With respect to the outcome of the Tokyo Round negotiations on
Article XIX, a few concluding words on the abandonment or weakening
of legal trade principles, such as the effect of safeguards on the MFN
principle, seem appropriate. Pragmatism and flexibility must prevail in
adjusting the GATT rules to meet new economic exigencies. This pragma-
tism and flexibility can reflect, in extreme cases, open non-compliance
with the GATT provisions. 49 2
If these departures from the GATT rules become customary activi-
ties, and if they are tolerated in spite of their inconsistency with generally
191 Id.; see also Perlow, supra note 162, at 118-30 (discussing the effectiveness of the
TSB).
492 J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 755-57.
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accepted principles, the custom of departing from a few legal rules may
encourage departures from other legal rules.493 Therefore the most dan-
gerous and difficult problems to solve are those in which non-compliance
with GATT principles is tolerated "because the parties at fault have suffi-
cient economic and political strength that it is impracticable to obtain
compliance from them when they are determined not to comply.
494
Indeed, in the Tokyo Round many countries felt that a formally ap-
proved deviation from the MFN principle on safeguards would under-
mine many other elements of the General Agreement.4 95 An expert on
GATT pointed out that a departure from an international norm like the
MFN principle "may be justified, but it has costs and those costs should
be recognized. 49 6
Regarding the issues of serious injury as well as surveillance and dis-
pute settlement, it should not be assumed that trade disputes will be re-
solved more easily merely in the presence of sufficient data and better
defined terminology. In most cases the data will be inadequate if a solu-
tion based exclusively on scientific scrutiny is attempted.497 In some in-
stances, such as the issue concerning the diversification of product mixes,
data simply cannot be obtained. As regards issues such as the causal rela-
tionship between imports and injury, it is extremely difficult to provide
conclusive data.49 8 Thus, a more precise injury definition and more effec-
tive data collection do not necessarily guarantee a solution to the dispute.
Better data and precise definitions may result in better founded deci-
sions by the working panel as more data from extrapolations, regressions,
and other scientific means of gathering information are made available. 9
Nevertheless, it remains that the acquisition of better data and defini-
tions is not the definitive factor in dispute resolution. The problem in-
volves more than just data and defintions. The parties must indeed sin-
cerely want the dispute to be settled by the panel.100 They must be
prepared to accept imperfect data and to negotiate accordingly without
searching for loopholes. 10'
It has been predicted that many of the negotiated codes on NTB's
will not prove to be effective because of the generally weak surveillance
4'1 Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions, supra note 481, at 97.
494 J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 758.
" See S. GoLT, supra note 439, at 44. The European Community and Scandanavian
countries did not share this view.
'0' J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 762-63.
497 R. HUDEC, supra note 11, at 158.
498 Id.
499 Id.
600 Id.
501 Id. at 159.
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and dispute settlement procedures. 02 In this regard, the failure to reach
an agreement on a permanent surveillance and dispute settlement body
which could provide the necessary independent framework for effective
conciliation, appears to be the biggest disappointment of the Article XIX
negotiations. Moreover, the principle of multilaterality as a substitution
for the MFN principle regarding selective safeguards and preferential
treatment for developing countries will be weakened from the beginning.
Establishment of the necessary procedural foundation for the formation
of such an independent and permanent review institution has not yet
been achieved.
502 R. BALDWIN, supra note 340, at 5-7.
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Appendix A
Article XIX
Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products
1. (a) If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the
obligations incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, includ-
ing tariff concessions, any product is being imported into the territory of
that contracting party in such increased quantities and under such condi-
tions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that
territory of like or directly competitive products, the contracting party
shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the extent and for such
time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend
the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the
concession.
(b) If any product, which is the subject of a concession with respect
to the preference, is being imported into the territory of a contracting
party in the circumstances set forth in sub-paragraph (a) of this para-
graph, so as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers of
like or directly competitive products in the territory of a contracting
party which receives or received such preference, the importing con-
tracting party shall be free, if that other contracting party so requests, to
suspend the relevant obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or
modify the concession in respect of the product, to the extent and for
such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury.
2. Before any contracting party shall take action pursuant to the provi-
sions of paragraph 1 of this Article, it shall give notice in writing to the
CONTRACTING PARTIES as far in advance as may be practicable and
shall afford the CONTRACTING PARTIES and those contracting par-
ties having a substantial interest as exporters of the product concerned an
opportunity to consult with it in respect of the proposed action. When
such notice is given in relation to a concession with respect to a prefer-
ence, the notice shall name the contracting party which has requested the
action. In critical circumstances, where delay would cause damage which
it would be difficult to repair, action under paragraph 1 of this Article
may be taken provisionally without prior consultation, on the condition
that consultation shall be effected immediately after taking such action.
3. (a) If agreement among the interested contracting party which pro-
poses to take or continue the action shall, nevertheless, be free to do so,
and if such action is taken or continued, the affected contracting parties
shall then be free, not later than ninety days after such action is taken, to
suspend, upon the expiration of thirty days from the day on which writ-
ten notice of such suspension is received by the CONTRACTING PAR-
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TIES, the application to the trade of the contracting party taking such
action, or, in the case envisaged in paragraph 1(b) of this Article, to the
trade of the contracting party requesting such action, of such substan-
tially equivalent concessions or other obligations under this Agreement
the suspension of which the CONTRACTING PARTIES do not
disapprove.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of this para-
graph, where action is taken under paragraph 2 of this Article without
prior consultation and causes or threatens serious injury in the territory
of a contracting party to the domestic producers of products affected by
the action, that contracting party shall, where delay would cause damage
difficult to repair, be free to suspend, upon the taking of the action and
throughout the period of consultation, such concessions or other obliga-
tions as may be necessary to prevent or remedy the injury.
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Appendix B
Article I
General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment
1. With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or
in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the interna-
tional transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to
the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all
rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and
with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article In,
any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting
party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall
be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product
originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting
parties.
